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THE ROLE OF TRUST LAW PRINCIPLES IN DEFINING 
PUBLIC TRUST DUTIES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES
John C. Dernbach*
ABSTRACT
Public trusts for natural resources incorporate both limits and duties on 
governments in their stewardship of those natural resources. They exist in every 
state in the United States—in constitutional provisions, statutes, and in common 
law. Yet the law recognizing public trusts for natural resources may contain only 
the most basic provisions—often just a sentence or two. The purpose and terms of 
these public trusts certainly answer some questions about the limits and duties of 
trustees, but they do not answer all questions. When questions arise that the body 
of law creating or recognizing a public trust for natural resources does not fully 
answer, trustees, lawyers, and courts often look to trust law for help. In fact, they 
have been doing so for more than a century, including in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s landmark 1892 public trust decision, Illinois Central Railroad Co. v 
Illinois. In this sense, trust law provides a set of background or underlying 
principles for interpreting and applying public trusts.
Using cases from around the country, this Article sets out a four-step 
methodology for determining when and how to use trust law principles to help 
interpret public trusts. This methodology can be applied in any case involving the 
use of specific trust principles to help interpret any particular public trust. This 
Article also explains that the relevant trust law should not be limited to private 
trust law, but rather it should include general trust principles, charitable trust law 
principles, and private (or noncharitable) trust law principles.
This Article uses a 2019 Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania decision, 
Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth, as 
a case study. The case applies article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, which requires that public natural resources be conserved and 
maintained for the benefit of present and future generations. In that case, the 
court used an interpretation of private trust law to decide that the state could 
spend some bonus and rental payment money from oil and gas leasing on state 
forest and park land, which is constitutional public trust property, for non-trust 
purposes. This Article applies the four-part methodology to the case, explains 
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general trust law and charitable trust law principles that the Commonwealth 
Court of Pennsylvania did not address, and argues that the use of these principles 
better fits the constitutional public trust. It concludes that the money from bonus 
and rental payments should be spent entirely for the purposes of the trust. 
This Article draws attention to both the potential value of trust law principles 
and also to their potential danger in the interpretation and application of public 
trust laws for natural resources. Trust law has the potential to enhance the 
protectiveness of public trusts by imposing various fiduciary duties on trustees. It 
also has the potential to undermine public trusts, particularly through rules 
requiring or encouraging that trust assets be financially productive. To vindicate 
public trusts for natural resources, environmental and natural resources lawyers 
need to become better trust lawyers.
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INTRODUCTION
Public trusts for natural resources incorporate both limits and 
duties on governments in their stewardship of those resources.1
They exist in every state in the United States—in constitutional 
provisions, statutes, and common law.2 These public trusts reflect 
fundamental public legacy values for the use and protection of 
particular natural resources and for their continuing availability to 
the public, both present and future generations.3 They are 
designed and implemented to protect natural, ecological, 
recreational, navigational, fishing, and similar public values of 
these resources, primarily on publicly-owned property, and to 
ensure that they are accessible to the public. They involve different 
kinds of natural resources, impose different duties on states, and 
1. The first and most influential statement of these limits and duties is Joseph L. Sax, 
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV.
471 (1970).
2. Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: 
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PA. ST. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 26–113 
(2007); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: 
Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 53, 93–197 (2010); see also Alexandra B. Klass, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Shadow of 
State Environmental Rights Laws: A Case Study, 45 ENV’T L. 431 (2015) (detailing the 
relationship between the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act and Minnesota’s public trust 
doctrine).
3. Sax, supra note 1, at 477 (explaining three limits and duties on government for 
public trust property: 1) the property must “not only be used for a public purpose, but it 
must be held available for use by the general public;” 2) limits on sale of property; and 3) 
maintenance of property “for particular types of uses”). On intergenerational equity, see
Erin Ryan, The Public Trust Doctrine, Private Water Allocation, and Mono Lake: The Historic Saga 
of National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 45 ENV’T L. 561, 633 (2015):
[A]n important difference between a state’s public trust obligations and its 
authority to protect public welfare under the police power more generally is that 
the public trust doctrine puts more focus on the welfare of future generations. In 
that way, the ‘public’ of the public trust doctrine requires consideration of 
intergenerational equity, necessarily infusing the doctrine with undertones of 
sustainability.
See also Donna R. Christie, Marine Reserves, the Public Trust Doctrine and Intergenerational Equity,
19 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 427, 433–34 (2004) (explaining the importance of 
intergenerational equity in public trust doctrine). Probably the most influential work on 
intergenerational equity in this context is EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE 
GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY
(1989).
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provide different rights to the public. They include, but are not 
limited to, trusts that fit within the more familiar public trust 
doctrine restricting transfer of title to trust resources exemplified 
in the U.S. Supreme Court’s iconic 1892 decision, Illinois Central 
Railroad Co. v. Illinois.4 They also include public trusts identified by 
state courts in terms of the public trust doctrine for those states.5
All public trusts for natural resources, however, reflect a 
fundamental societal mandate to provide legacy protection to 
natural values in these resources so that the public, present and 
future, will continue to have and enjoy them. 
Yet the law recognizing public trusts for natural resources may
contain only the most basic provisions—often just a sentence or 
two. The purpose and terms of these public trusts certainly answer 
some questions about the limits and duties of trustees, but they do 
not answer all questions. When questions arise that the body of law 
creating or recognizing a public trust for natural resources does 
not fully answer, trustees, lawyers, and courts often look to trust law 
for help. Although public trust law for natural resources has 
ancient Roman roots,6 it is not as well developed in the United 
States as the law of trusts. In this sense, trust law provides a set of 
background or underlying principles for interpreting and applying 
public trusts.
But what trust law should be considered? The answer to this 
would seem to be easy, but it has not been easy. Traditional trust 
law, or simply trust law, is the large body of common law and 
statutory trust law that is ordinarily labeled as such in texts, 
treatises, and restatements on the subject. It includes principles 
that apply to all trusts, such as the overall structure of trusts, prin-
ciples requiring the trustee to adhere to the terms of the trust, and 
principles defining the responsibility of trustees toward beneficiar-
ies. Public trusts for natural resources are not ordinarily described 
as part of trust law. Trust law, thus understood, could be described 
as private trust law, because it is not public trust law. That is how 
4. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). In that case, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that states hold title to the land under navigable waters in trust for public 
benefits like navigation and fishing, that the trust “is governmental,” and that such lands 
cannot be alienated except to the extent that doing so would be consistent with the 
purposes and fiduciary requirements of the trust. Id. at 452, 455–56.
5. Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1032–33 (Alaska 1999); Slocum v. Borough of 
Belmar, 569 A.2d 312, 317 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989).
6. Sax, supra note 1, at 475. For a recent and detailed exploration of the Roman roots 
of the public trust doctrine by a natural resources law scholar and a Roman history scholar, 
see J.B. Ruhl & Thomas A.J. McGinn, The Roman Public Trust Doctrine: What Was It, and Does It 
Support an Atmospheric Trust?, 47 ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3440244. See also Bruce W. Frier, The Roman Origins of 
the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 J. ROMAN ARCHAEOLOGY 641 (2019).
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judges and lawyers writing on public trusts for natural resources 
have often appeared to understand what private trust law means.7
But private trust law has a second and narrower meaning. Trust 
law generally divides express trusts into two categories: charitable 
trusts and noncharitable (or private) trusts.8 Trust lawyers thus 
tend to refer to private trust law as the law for trusts that are not 
charitable trusts. That is the meaning used in this Article.
Not surprisingly, the two meanings of private trust law are often 
conflated. When that occurs, lawyers and judges may look only to
private trust law for help in interpreting public trusts for natural 
resources. They do not consider general trust law principles, even 
though they have played a formative role in the development of 
public trusts for natural resources. Nor do they consider the use of 
charitable trust law—particularly the law for perpetual charitable 
trusts—despite the great similarities between public trusts for natu-
ral resources and perpetual charitable trusts. By limiting their 
search to private law principles, lawyers and judges fail to consider 
trust law principles that could more fully effectuate the terms and 
purpose of public trusts for natural resources.
This Article explores circumstances under which trust law, in-
cluding not only private trust law but also general trust law princi-
ples and charitable trust law, should be used to help interpret the 
meaning of any particular public trust for natural resources. It clar-
ifies and expands the range of traditional trust law principles for 
understanding and applying public trust laws. In so doing, it pro-
vides an approach for more fully effectuating, and even strength-
ening the protectiveness of, public trusts for natural resources.
This Article also sets out a four-step methodology for determin-
ing when and how to use specific trust law principles to help inter-
pret public trusts. Under this methodology, a court first examines 
the language and purpose of the law recognizing the public trust. 
7. See, e.g., Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 277 (1954) (Reed, J., concurring ) (“The 
United States holds resources and territory in trust for its citizens in one sense, but not in 
the sense that a private trustee holds for a cestui que trust.”); Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Com-
monwealth (PEDF II), 161 A.3d 911, 940–49, (Pa. 2017) (Baer, J., concurring and dissent-
ing) (contrasting public trust with private trust); New York State Bar Ass’n Env’t & Energy L. 
Section, Report and Recommendations Concerning Environmental Aspects of the New York State Con-
stitution, 38 PACE L. REV. 182, 204–05 (2017) (“We are doubtful about the propriety of apply-
ing technical aspects of private trust law to a constitutionally-expressed environmental pub-
lic trust right and recommend that the drafting and legislative history accompanying the 
adoption of an environmental right in New York should indicate that it is grounded in the 
traditional public trust doctrine.”). Similarly, when I have used “private trust law” in my 
previous articles on public trusts for natural resources, I have used private trust law to 
describe trust law that is not public trust law. E.g., John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania 
Constitution Seriously When It Protects the Environment: Part II - Environmental Rights and Public 
Trust, 104 DICK. L. REV. 97 (1999) (using “private trust law” as synonymous with “trust law”).
8. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
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Courts are duty-bound, after all, to carry out the trust. The second 
step is to analyze whether the law recognizing the public trust 
supplies an answer to the question being asked. To the extent that 
the public trust provision does not answer the question, the third 
step is to identify what trust principles can be employed to help 
provide an answer. The fourth and final step in giving 
determinative meaning to a public trust duty is to evaluate which of 
the relevant principles best fits the public trust at hand.
In many ways, the application of trust law principles to public 
trusts for natural resources makes perfect sense. After all, the basic 
structure of public trusts for natural resources is similar to that of a
standard trust.9 Both involve specified property or natural 
resources, called the trust corpus or res. Both are to be 
administered by a trustee in accordance with the trust terms for 
the benefit of specified beneficiaries or the public. For public 
trusts, the trustee is typically the relevant government or 
governments. Both involve a settlor who created the trust and 
established its terms.10 Both trusts and public trusts have rules 
prohibiting or sharply limiting the use of the trust corpus for 
purposes other than those stated in the trust.11
In fact, much of the attractiveness of public trust law for natural 
resources is that it borrows from a body of law—trust law, including 
both charitable and private trust law—with which lawyers are 
9. MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 3 (2d ed. 2015) (“The basic construct, as 
well as many of the same principles” of trust law also apply to the public trust.).
10. For the public trust, the definition of a settlor is more complicated. For a 
constitutional provision adopted by public referendum, the settlor could be understood as 
the people. For a statutory provision, the settlor could be the legislature. But rights, 
including public trust rights concerning natural resources, can also be said to derive from 
inherent human rights. In this sense, lawmakers do not create rights as a settlor does in an 
ordinary trust; lawmakers recognize pre-existing (or inherent) human rights. For example, 
the rights contained in article I of Pennsylvania’s constitution including the environmental 
public trust contained in article I, section 27, “are inherent in man’s nature and preserved 
rather than created by the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 
A.3d 901, 948 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion by Castille, C.J.); see also Juliana v. United States, 
217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1261 (D. Or. 2016) (public trust doctrine for natural resources is an
inherent right of people grounded in Due Process Clause), rev’d on other grounds, 947 F.3d 
1159 (9th Cir. 2020); Michael C. Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”:
Climate Change, Due Process, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 43 (2017) (the 
public trust doctrine for natural resources “is an inherent constitutional limit on 
sovereignty.”); Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4 WAKE 
FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281, 316 (2014) (“Pursuant to the public trust doctrine, our 
government has a fundamental obligation to protect the resources that are central to our 
society—land, water, wildlife, and air. This obligation predates the Constitution and actually 
underlies the very purpose of the Constitution.”).
11. BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 9, at 5–8 (explaining trustees, beneficiaries, trust assets, 
and fiduciary duties of trustees).
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already familiar.12 Because trust law generally tends to be better 
developed and more detailed than public trust law, trust law is an 
especially valuable analogy. It provides a resource for addressing 
issues that may be new in the public trust context but that have 
already been addressed not only in general trust law but also in 
charitable and private trust law.13
But how far should that analogy be taken?
Intuitively, the conclusion that the government has a fiduciary 
duty toward certain natural resources would appear to mean that 
the government has a greater duty toward those resources than it 
would otherwise have.14 After all, the level of protection contained 
12. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ROBERT H. ABRAMS, ROBERT L. GRAHAM, LISA HEINZERLING,
DAVID A. WIRTH & NOAH D. HALL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY 887 (5th ed. 2016) (explaining that trust law is “more commonly litigated” than 
public trust law).
13. Kenneth T. Kristl, The Devil Is in the Details: Articulating Practical Principles for 
Implementing the Duties in Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment, 28 GEO. ENV’T L.
REV. 589, 602 (2016) (“[T]he well-developed law of private and charitable trusts provides 
familiar guideposts that can make navigating the perhaps less-familiar waters of public trust 
doctrine easier for trustees, beneficiaries, and judges.”); Mary Turnipseed, Stephen E. 
Roady, Raphael Sagarin & Larry B. Crowder, The Silver Anniversary of the United States’ 
Exclusive Economic Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the Possibility of a Blue 
Water Public Trust Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 16 (2009) (“[T]he nature of the public trust 
and the duties it imposes on state trustees can be elucidated by comparison to the well-
developed body of law regarding private and charitable trusts.”); Kent D. Morihara, 
Comment, Hawai’i Constitution, Article XI, Section I: The Conservation, Protection, and Use of 
Natural Resources, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 177, 185 (1997) (“Because little has been said in the 
courts defining the precise scope of the public trust doctrine in the United States, the laws 
of private and charitable trusts may be useful to provide insight in determining the rights a 
state has and the duties a state must observe as trustee.”). Trust law also provides tools for 
public trust advocates. Susan D. Baer, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine—A Tool to Make 
Federal Administrative Agencies Increase Protection of Public Land and Its Resources, 15 B.C. ENV’T
AFF. L. REV. 385, 419–21 (1988) (arguing that principles of traditional trust law, including 
charitable trust law, provide a set of tools for advocates for greater protection of public trust 
resources that specify with greater precision the duties that trustees have for those 
resources).
14. The most well-developed argument for applying trust law principles to the public 
trust is contained in MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A 
NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE (2014). She posits six substantive and five procedural duties for 
natural resource public trustees that are based on, or adapted from, trust law. She writes:
The six substantive fiduciary duties require a public trustee to: (1) protect the res;
(2) conserve the natural inheritance of future generations (the duty against 
waste); (3) maximize the societal value of natural resources; (4) restore the trust 
res where it has been damaged; (5) recover natural resource damages from third 
parties that have injured public trust assets; and (6) refrain from alienating (that 
is, privatizing) the trust except in limited circumstances.
Id. at 167; see also id. at 167–87 (explaining each). In addition:
Procedurally, a trustee has five main duties: (1) maintain uncompromised loyalty 
to the beneficiaries; (2) adequately supervise agents; (3) exercise good faith and 
reasonable skill in managing the assets; (4) use caution in managing the assets; 
and (5) furnish information to the beneficiaries regarding trust management and 
asset health.
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in environmental and natural resources laws tends to be couched 
in terms of economic and technical feasibility, the balancing of 
environmental and economic interests, or consideration of 
environmental impacts and alternatives.15 Trustees, by contrast, are 
not allowed to simply balance away their duties regarding the trust 
corpus or allow it to degrade based on the claimed interests of 
others who are not designated beneficiaries. What can trust law tell 
us in specific terms about what difference, if any, fiduciary 
responsibility for public natural resources makes for the level of 
protection afforded to those resources?
On the other hand, there may be situations where trust law 
principles are less protective of public natural resources or 
beneficiaries than the public trust terms would indicate. Should a 
private trustee’s duty to balance the financial interest of the 
income and principal beneficiaries be applied to lands that are to 
be held in trust for their environmental value? Can private trust 
law principles water down or weaken a public trust for natural 
resources?16 In fact, many are averse to the use of any trust law to 
interpret public trusts for natural resources because they fear what 
private trust law could do to these public trusts.17
This Article draws attention to both the potential value of trust 
law principles in the interpretation and application of public trust 
laws for natural resources and to their potential danger. Just as ju-
dicial decisions applying certain traditional trust law principles can 
enhance the effectiveness of these public trusts, so, too, can judi-
cial decisions applying other trust law principles weaken the effec-
tiveness of public trust laws for natural resources. The four-step 
methodology described in this Article provides an analytical 
framework for deciding whether a specific trust law principle 
should be applied in a particular setting. The short answer to the 
general question of whether to apply traditional trust law for pub-
lic natural resources trusts is not “yes” or “no,” but rather, “it de-
pends.” To vindicate public trusts for natural resources,
environmental and natural resources lawyers need to become bet-
ter trust lawyers.
This Article uses Pennsylvania as a case study. Pennsylvania has a
public trust provision for natural resources—article I, section 27—
Id. at 189; see also id. at 189–204 (explaining each).
15. Every student and practitioner of environmental law is constantly exposed to these 
limitations, and they are taught in environmental law classes. See, e.g., PLATER ET AL., supra 
note 12; JOEL A. MINTZ, JOHN C. DERNBACH, STEVE C. GOLD, KALYANI ROBBINS, CLIFFORD 
VILLA & WENDY WAGNER, A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2017).
16. See infra Section I.A.
17. See, e.g., New York State Bar Ass’n Env’t & Energy L. Section, supra note 7.
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in its constitution18 and has decided expressly to use trust law to 
help interpret that provision.19 The public trust part of section 27, 
which is only two sentences in length, requires the Commonwealth 
to conserve and maintain public natural resources for the benefit 
of present and future generations.20 Pennsylvania is among a hand-
ful of states that are making express use of trust law principles to 
help interpret public trusts.21 While no state has yet fully thought 
through the consequences of this endeavor or how to properly go 
about it, Pennsylvania provides useful lessons for other states—
both those that have already applied trust law principles to their 
public trust and those that have not.
Part I of this Article surveys how courts have addressed the 
question of whether and how to use trust law principles to help in-
terpret their public trusts for natural resources. It shows that, for 
more than a century, including in the U.S. Supreme Court’s land-
mark 1892 public trust decision, Illinois Central Railroad Co. v Illi-
nois,22 courts have employed trust law principles to help determine 
the meaning of public trusts for natural resources, although in 
some cases they have refused to apply these principles. It also 
shows the importance of examining all relevant trust law, not just 
private trust law.
Part II explains the case study, describing a 2019 Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court decision, Pennsylvania Environmental Defense 
Foundation v. Commonwealth (PEDF III).23 In that case, the court used 
an interpretation of private trust law to decide that the state could 
spend some bonus and rental payment money from oil and gas 
leasing on state forest and park land, which is constitutional public 
trust property, for non-trust purposes. Part II also explains the 
background against which this case was decided, including two 
18. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
19. See infra Part II.
20. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
21. States identified in Section I.B.1—California, Hawai’i, Mississippi, and New Jersey—
are among the others.
22. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
23. Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 214 A.3d 748 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2019). In Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF I), 108 A.3d 140 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2015), the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania decided against PEDF’s article I, section 
27 claim that royalties received from oil and gas production in state forests should be used 
exclusively for trust purposes—to conserve and maintain public natural resources. See infra
notes 189–90 and accompanying text. In PEDF II, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017), the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that these royalties must be used for trust 
purposes under article I, section 27. The state supreme court remanded to the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court the question of whether bonus and rental money from oil and gas 
leasing must also be limited to trust purposes. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania’s
decision on that remand is PEDF III.
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions that have revitalized section 
27.
Part III applies the four-part methodology to PEDF III, explains 
general trust law and charitable trust law principles that the Com-
monwealth Court of Pennsylvania did not address, and argues that 
these latter principles better fit the constitutional public trust. It 
concludes that the money from bonus and rental payments should 
be spent entirely for the purposes of the trust.
The use of traditional trust law is important in Pennsylvania, 
where the state supreme court has brought section 27 out of more 
than four decades of near dormancy, because it will likely affect 
the trajectory of future jurisprudence under the amendment.
Because the new section 27 jurisprudence is still at an early stage,
the trajectory of that jurisprudence is still fluid. But these questions 
also matter in other states and countries. For a long time, 
Pennsylvania probably has been the most prominent of any U.S. 
state with constitutional environmental protection.24 Now, after re-
cent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions revitalizing section 27,
it is at least as prominent, if not more so. For example, it is inform-
ing a global discussion about environmental provisions in 
constitutions.25 Pennsylvania’s experience has also prompted 
advocacy for similar “green amendments” in other state 
constitutions.26 In addition, there is a growing global movement 
toward constitutionalizing environmental protection.27 This 
movement exists among U.S. states28 and in other countries.29
24. John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It Protects the 
Environment: Part I—An Interpretative Framework for Article I, Section 27, 103 DICK. L. REV. 693,
697–98 (1999) (citing various sources).
25. JAMES R. MAY & ERIN DALY, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 223–28 
(2014) (describing Pennsylvania case law in detail and describing the state as an “outlier”
among states “in engaging constitutional environmental rights”). For an explanation of 
Robinson Township’s potential to influence global developments, see James R. May & Erin 
Daly, Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania: A Model for Environmental Constitutionalism, 21 
WIDENER L. REV. 151 (2015).
26. MAYA VAN ROSSUM, THE GREEN AMENDMENT: SECURING OUR RIGHT TO A HEALTHY 
ENVIRONMENT 221–48 (2017); see also Devra R. Cohen, Note, Forever Evergreen: Amending the 
Washington State Constitution for a Healthy Environment, 90 WASH. L. REV. 349 (2015).
27. See generally MAY & DALY, supra note 25.
28. More than two-thirds of state constitutions contain provisions concerning natural 
resources and the environment, and all state constitutions written since 1959 have such 
provisions. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: The Potential 
Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 865, 871 (1996). For a more recent account 
of state constitutional provisions and caselaw, see James R. May & William Romanowicz, 
Environmental Rights in State Constitutions, in PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 305 (James R. May ed., 2011).
29. The constitutions of nearly 170 countries, containing three-fourths of the world’s
population, include some form of environmental protection. John C. Dernbach, Kenneth T. 
Kristl & James R. May, Recognition of Environmental Rights for Pennsylvania Citizens:
Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 70 
RUTGERS L. REV. 803, 844–45 (2018).
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Some national constitutions contain public trust provisions for 
such resources.30 More broadly, as already noted, there are already 
constitutional, statutory, and common law public trusts for natural 
resources in every state.31 In all states, as well as in countries with 
constitutional, statutory, or judicially recognized public trusts for 
natural resources, the proper use of trust law to help interpret the 
meaning of public trusts—and to enhance their effectiveness—is 
likely to be of considerable value.32
Finally, a plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
emphasized that section 27, properly understood and applied, 
should have the effect of promoting sustainable development.33
Sustainable development is a normative conceptual framework for 
integrating social and economic development with environmental 
protection in a way that fully realizes both, instead of treating them 
as inherently opposing concepts.34 A major challenge in realizing 
the transition to sustainability is to more fully and effectively 
convert that framework into law.35 The application of traditional 
trust principles to public trusts for natural resources will help test 
the effectiveness of this legal tool in fostering sustainable 
development.
30. MAY & DALY, supra note 25, at 267–69 (identifying Bhutan, Ethiopia, Ghana, Papua 
New Guinea, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Uganda as having general public trust provisions in 
their constitutions, and explaining that the India Supreme Court has read the public trust 
doctrine into its constitution).
31. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
32. This approach is broadly consistent with the proposal contained in Alexandra B. 
Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 699 (2006) (advancing a theoretical framework for public trust law for natural 
resources that blends this law with relevant statutes and regulations).
33. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 958, 963, 978, 980–81 (Pa. 2013).
34. JOHN C. DERNBACH, ROBERT ADLER, RACHEL ARMSTRONG, JENNIFER BAKA, ATHENA 
BALLESTEROS, GARY D. BASS, DONALD A. BROWN, CARL BRUCH, WYNN CALDER, FEDERICO 
CHEEVER, MARIAN R. CHERTOW, JAIMIE P. CLOUD, ILONA COYLE, ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, JULIAN 
DAUTREMONT-SMITH, MICHAEL DIRAMIO, CATHERINE EASTON, ANNE H. EHRLICH, JOEL B.
EISEN, JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, LYNN R. GOLDMAN, KIRK HERBERTSON, DIETER T. HESSEL,
KEITH H. HIROKAWA, LEO HORRIGAN, FRANCES IRWIN, KEVIN KENNEDY, JOHN A. LAITNER,
JEANNINE M. LA PRAD, AMY E. LANDIS, ROBERT LAWRENCE, MARK D. LEVINE, REID LIFSET,
ROBERTA MANN, BRIAN MCNAMARA, JOEL A. MINTZ, CRAIG OREN, BRADLEY C. PARKS, TRIP 
POLLARD, DAVID REJESKI, EDWARD P. RICHARDS, J. TIMMONS ROBERTS, K.W. JAMES ROCHOW,
PATRICIA E. SALKIN, JIM SALZMAN, BRENT STEEL, KURT A. STRASSER, SUSANNA SUTHERLAND,
DAN TARLOCK, MICHAEL J. TIERNEY, JONATHAN WEISS & CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, ACTING AS 
IF TOMORROW MATTERS: ACCELERATING THE TRANSITION TO SUSTAINABILITY 3–7 (2012) 
(explaining sustainable development).
35. Id. at 241–65 (outlining legal changes required to effectuate transition to 
sustainability).
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I. THE USE OF TRUST LAW PRINCIPLES TO INTERPRET NATURAL 
RESOURCES PUBLIC TRUSTS
Courts frequently analyze public trusts of all kinds with the aid 
of trust law principles. Just as traditional trustees are judicially 
accountable for their management of the trust corpus, courts say, 
so also are government trustees for their management of the 
public trust corpus.36 This is not a recent phenomenon.
Nineteenth-century courts came to treat the disposition of public 
property by cities as subject to the same fiduciary rules as private 
trustees, and modern courts still do. 37
This also applies to public trusts for natural resources. Courts 
have made implicit use of trust law principles to interpret these 
public trusts for well over a century. They have also expressly con-
sidered the use of trust law, applying these principles when they 
would effectuate the terms and purpose of public trusts, and refus-
ing to do so when they would not. Although charitable trusts are 
similar to public trusts for natural resources, the law of charitable 
trusts seems to have received much less attention in this context.
A.  Illinois Central and the Implicit Judicial Use of Traditional 
Trust Law 
Because trust law is so well developed and recognized, the 
conceptual framework of trust law and many of its principles 
inform cases involving natural resources public trusts to some de-
gree even when courts do not expressly explain their decisions in 
these terms. The U.S. Supreme Court’s famous decision in Illinois 
Central Railroad Co. v Illinois is illustrative.38 In his influential 1970 
law review article on the public trust, Professor Joseph Sax de-
scribed this case as “the most celebrated case in American public 
trust law.”39 The courts in at least thirty-five states have cited the 
36. Ariz. Ctr. for L. in the Pub. Int. v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) 
(“Just as private trustees are judicially accountable to their beneficiaries for dispositions of 
the res, so the legislative and executive branches are judicially accountable for their 
dispositions of the public trust.”) (citation omitted); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 
P.3d 409, 455 (Haw. 2000) (quoting prior statement from Hassell); see also State v. Hale, 573 
N.E.2d 46, 50 (Ohio 1991) (noting it is “well settled” under American law that a public 
official entrusted with public money is a trustee of public trust fund with the same level of 
responsibility as a trustee of private trust fund).
37. Max Schanzenbach & Nadav Shoked, Reclaiming Fiduciary Law for the City, 70 STAN.
L. REV. 565, 585–95 (2018).
38. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
39. Sax, supra note 1, at 489.
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case in articulating their public trust laws for natural resources.40
The Supreme Court in that case held that states hold submerged 
lands under navigable waters in trust for certain public purposes 
and cannot alienate those lands except in conformance with those 
purposes and their fiduciary responsibilities. Although Illinois Cen-
tral is probably the landmark case in American public trust law, it is 
also a breach of trust case.41 This fact has profound consequences 
because it means that traditional trust law is a foundation of public 
trust law for natural resources.
The case involved the lawfulness of the Illinois legislature’s 1869 
fee simple grant to the Illinois Central Railroad Company of more 
than 1,000 acres of submerged lands in Lake Michigan.42 The par-
cel, one mile in length, was on Chicago’s lakefront in Lake Michi-
gan.43 It was also three times the size of Chicago’s outer harbor.44
The legislature’s evident purpose was to enable the railroad, after 
filling in these lands (or “reclaiming” them), to “construct such 
wharves, piers, docks, and other works therein as it may deem 
proper for its interest and business.”45 More likely than not, cor-
rupt means were used to procure adoption of the 1869 act,46 a
point that the court alluded to when it said that the circumstances 
of the Act’s passage had been “the subject of much criticism.”47 In 
1873, the Illinois legislature repealed the grant.48 The case involved 
the lawfulness of the repeal, which turned on the lawfulness of the 
original 1869 grant.
While the court does not use “breach of trust” in its analysis, the 
basis for that conclusion is not hard to discern. The court first ex-
plained the scope and terms of the trust, based on “numerous”
prior cases.49 It held that the state of Illinois holds title to sub-
merged lands under the navigable waters of Lake Michigan “in 
trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the navigation 
of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of 
fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or interference of pri-
vate parties.”50 The trust relationship between the state and the 
40. Crystal S. Chase, The Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine and Federal Common Law: 
An Unconventional View, 16 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVT. L. & POL’Y 113, 151–53 (2010).
41. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doc-
trine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 920–21 (2004) (de-
scribing the Court as holding that there was a “clear breach of trust”).
42. Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 45.
43. Id. at 433.
44. Id. at 454.
45. Id. at 448 (summarizing company’s claim for relief).
46. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 41, at 887–94.
47. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 451.
48. Id. at 449.
49. Id. at 455.
50. Id. at 452.
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public is stated in terms akin to the traditional trust relationship 
between trustee and beneficiary. Submerged lands, the court stat-
ed, are “held by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for 
the public.”51 That means the state is not holding them in a propri-
etary capacity, which would have allowed the state to sell them. The 
court also stated that the state’s trust responsibility “can only be 
discharged by the management and control of property in which 
the public has an interest, [and] cannot be relinquished by a trans-
fer of the property.”52
The terms of the trust limit what the state can do with trust 
property. While the state can grant parcels of submerged lands for 
construction of wharves, docks, and piers to aid in navigation, the 
court explained, it cannot abdicate general control “over lands 
under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea 
or lake.”53 The court reasoned that “[s]uch abdication is not con-
sistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the govern-
ment of the state to preserve such waters for the use of the pub-
lic.”54 The court did not say that the state was prohibited from al-
alienating these public trust lands; it said only that the state did not 
have the power to do so in a way that violated the terms of the pub-
lic trust.
Yet that is what the state had done. By granting more than 1,000 
acres of submerged lands to the railroad, the court held, the legis-
lature breached the terms of the public trust: 
The harbor of Chicago is of immense value to the 
people of the state of Illinois, in the facilities it affords to its 
vast and constantly increasing commerce; and the idea that 
its legislature can deprive the state of control over its bed 
and waters, and place the same in the hands of a private 
corporation, created for a different purpose, one limited to 
transportation of passengers and freight between distant 
points and the city, is a proposition that cannot be 
defended.55
The breach of trust issue is a recurring theme in cases involving 
public trusts for natural resources, including submerged land cases 
decided in the decades immediately following Illinois Central. While 
the courts often found that there was no breach, they used trust 
51. Id. at 455.
52. Id. at 453.
53. Id. at 452–53.
54. Id. at 453.
55. Id. at 454.
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law concepts to explain their decisions. They did not, however, cite 
to trust law. Two cases are illustrative.56
In a 1916 case, State v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh Railroad Co., three 
railroads, littoral owners of land on Lake Erie, filled in submerged 
lands “for the purpose of enabling them to reach navigation and to 
perform their duties as common carriers,” and for no other pur-
pose.57 The Ohio Supreme Court held that this did not violate the 
public trust. It explained: “The littoral owner has an undoubted 
right of access to the water, and if this right is to be of value, it 
must be such access as will enable him to reach navigable water 
and to do the things necessary to that end.”58 The Ohio court said 
that the railroads’ exercise of their property rights was consistent 
with the public trust right of navigation, and the state had not de-
fined what constitutes a violation of public rights. It therefore held 
that the public trust was not violated.59
The court’s explanation of the state’s public trust duties makes 
clear its view that trust law principles are helpful in understanding 
the meaning of the public trust for submerged lands:
The state as trustee for the public cannot, by 
acquiescence, abandon the trust property or enable a 
diversion of it to private ends different from the object for 
which the trust was created. If it is once fully realized that 
the state is merely the custodian of the legal title, charged 
with the specific duty of protecting the trust estate and 
regulating its use, a clearer view can be had.60
Unlike Illinois Central, where the court did not expressly describe 
Illinois as a trustee, the Ohio Supreme Court described Ohio as 
the trustee and referred to the submerged bottomlands as “the 
trust estate.” The court also indicated that the case can be under-
stood with “a clearer view” if trust concepts are employed.61
In its 1927 decision in City of Milwaukee v. State,62 the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court upheld the Wisconsin legislature’s grant of a 
smaller parcel of submerged land under Lake Michigan to the city 
of Milwaukee, in order to enable the city’s subsequent conveyance 
of the parcel to a steel company. The court held that this grant did 
56. Both of these were quoted by Professor Sax in his 1970 article. Sax, supra note 1, at 
486, 515–16.
57. State v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R. Co., 113 N.E. 677, 683 (Ohio 1916).
58. Id. at 681.
59. Id. at 683.
60. Id. at 682.
61. See id.
62. City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820 (Wis. 1927).
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not violate the state’s public trust law. The grant was for a parcel of 
submerged land that extended 1,500 feet from Milwaukee’s Lake 
Michigan shoreline and was to be filled in and used for wharves, 
docks, and similar navigation structures as part of an overall devel-
opment scheme for the entire harbor.63 The court distinguished 
Illinois Central, holding that the grant was instigated by a public 
purpose consistent with the public trust in the lake—navigation—
not for the private purposes of a corporation.64
The Wisconsin Supreme Court explained its decision in terms 
that read very much like those used in traditional trust law. In trust 
law, including Wisconsin trust law at the time of this decision, the 
trustee has legal title to the trust corpus while the beneficiary has
equitable title.65 The Wisconsin court explained the public trust in 
submerged lands in those terms:
The trust reposed in the state is not a passive trust; it is 
governmental, active, and administrative. Representing the 
state in its legislative capacity, the Legislature is fully vested 
with the power of control and regulation. The equitable 
title to these submerged lands vests in the public at large, 
while the legal title vests in the state, restricted only by the 
trust, and the trust, being both active and administrative, 
requires the lawmaking body to act in all cases where action 
is necessary, not only to preserve the trust, but to promote 
it.66
The public trust for submerged lands under navigable waters is a 
public trust for natural resources. Yet this public trust is not an eco-
logical trust in any modern sense of the term. Filling in lakeshore 
is not an environmentally protective practice. Indeed, the Clean 
Water Act of 1972 prohibits the filling of such bottomlands without 
a permit, and the requirements for obtaining such a permit are 
stringent.67 Moreover, the public trust’s orientation toward promot-
ing commerce and navigation is not balanced by any broad envi-
ronmental protection duty on the part of the state. To the extent 
that such a duty exists, it is provided primarily by modern envi-
63. Id. at 824.
64. Id. at 831–32.
65. Danforth v. City of Oshkosh, 97 N.W. 258, 263 (Wis. 1903).
66. City of Milwaukee, 214 N.W. at 830. For a thorough analysis of Wisconsin’s recent 
administration of its public trust responsibilities, see generally Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, 
Comment, The Evolution of the Public Trust Doctrine and the Degradation of Trust Resources: 
Courts, Trustees and Political Power in Wisconsin, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 135 (2000).
67. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344; 40 C.F.R. pt. 230 (2020) (guide-
lines for issuing or denying such a permit).
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ronmental law. To be sure, these lands must also be held open to 
the public for fishing, and it is possible to infer from this duty that 
states have some correlative duty to protect and conserve fisheries.
The more critical point is that traditional trust law and public 
trust law for natural resources are not two entirely different bodies 
of law. Rather, they have the same fundamental structures and
share many of the same principles. While the Illinois Central court 
and many subsequent courts were not explicit about this point, 
they were fitting traditional trust law to the special public circum-
stances of these cases, and their decisions were built upon their 
implicit understanding of this point. Traditional trust law is not a
stranger to public trust law. For all practical purposes—going back 
at least to Illinois Central—it has been a core part of public trust law 
for natural resources for a long time.
B. Explicit Consideration of Trust Law Principles 
In the cases that follow, courts are explicit about their considera-
tion of trust law. Although not all states have found trust principles 
applicable to their natural resources public trusts, some states have 
applied trust law principles when these principles would further a 
public trust for natural resources. When these principles would 
undermine or impede a natural resources public trust, courts tend 
to refuse to apply them. 
1. Use of Trust Law Principles to Further Public Trusts
Courts often use trust law principles to help answer questions 
about the meaning of public trusts for natural resources. In so 
doing, the central objective is effectuating the purpose of the 
particular public trust in question. In the cases below, various 
constitutional and statutory public trusts are directed, to some 
degree, at protecting natural resources. These cases involve gen-
eral trust principles, not trust principles for private trusts or chari-
table trusts. Courts have used general trust law to determine the 
duty or standard of care that a trustee must employ for these 
resources. These duties include the duty to monitor trust property, 
the duty to manage trust property with prudence, and the duty of 
undivided loyalty to beneficiaries. Courts have also used trust 
principles to decide that revenues from the use or sale of natural 
resources can be expended only in ways that are consistent with 
the terms of the trust. When trusts are created for purposes other 
than natural resources protection, however, using trust principles 
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to help interpret their meaning will not make them more 
protective. The purpose and terms of the trust are the primary 
determinants of its protectiveness.
A useful starting point is the Hawai’i Supreme Court’s 2019 
decision in Ching v. Case, which employed the duty of care under 
trust law.68 In this case, the court used the trustee’s duty of care to 
help determine the state’s responsibility for managing land for 
which it has a constitutional public trust responsibility. Under 
Hawai’i’s constitution, “[a]ll public natural resources are held in 
trust by the State for the benefit of the people,” including present 
and future generations.69 In 1964, Hawai’i’s Department of Land 
and Natural Resources leased 22,900 acres of public trust land to 
the United States for military purposes for a sixty-five-year period.70
The lease contained conditions intended to protect the land from 
damage and contamination.71 Plaintiffs sued the state for failure to 
protect these lands in accordance with the lease terms and the 
state’s constitutional public trust duties.72 The trial court agreed 
with the plaintiffs, and the state supreme court affirmed.
The Hawai’i Supreme Court held that “an essential component 
of the State’s duty to protect and preserve trust land is an 
obligation to reasonably monitor a third party’s use of the 
property.”73 This duty, the court said, “exists independent of 
whether the third party has, in fact, violated the terms of any 
agreement governing its use of the land.”74 The court further held 
that the state “breached its constitutional trust duties by failing to 
reasonably monitor or inspect the trust land at issue.”75 “The most 
basic aspect of the State’s trust duties,” the court explained, is the 
“obligation ‘to protect and maintain’ the trust property and regu-
68. Ching v. Case, 449 P.3d 1146 (Haw. 2019).
69. HAW. CONST. art. 11, § 1.
70. Ching, 449 P.3d at 1150.
71. Id. at 1150–51
72. Id. at 1152–53.
73. Id. at 1150.
74. Id. The common law duty to protect the trust corpus, embodied in the public trust 
doctrine, is also a fundamental part of plaintiffs’ argument in Juliana v. United States, 217 F.
Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d on other grounds, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020). The 
district court held that plaintiffs could validly use substantive due process as a basis for 
enforcing the public trust doctrine to protect the atmosphere from climate change. “The 
natural resources trust operates according to basic trust principles, which impose upon the 
trustee a fiduciary duty to ‘protect the trust property against damage or destruction.’ “ Id. at 
1254 (quoting GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT & AMY MORRIS HESS,
BOGERT’S THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (2016)). “The government, as trustee, has a 
fiduciary duty to protect the trust assets from damage so that current and future trust 
beneficiaries will be able to enjoy the benefits of the trust.” Id. (citing WOOD, supra note 14, 
at 167–75).
75. Ching, 449 P.3d at 1150.
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late[] its use.”76 The court then stated that, “[u]nder the common 
law, this obligation includes an obligation to reasonably monitor 
the trust property.”77 “Reasonable monitoring ensures that a 
trustee fulfills the mandate of ‘elementary trust law’ that trust 
property not be permitted to ‘fall into ruin on [the trustee’s] 
watch.’ ”78
The Hawai’i Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s
determination that the state had breached this duty; the state 
provided evidence of only three inspection reports over the many 
decades of the lease, all of which were inadequate.79 The limited 
evidence that did exist indicated significant damage to 
environmental, cultural, and historic resources, and the state’s
failure to restore that damage.80 The state thus “breached its consti-
tutional trust duties by failing to reasonably monitor or inspect the 
trust land at issue.”81
Another basic duty of trustees toward beneficiaries is the duty to 
use ordinary prudence and skill. This duty means “that trustees are 
bound in the management of all the matters of the trust to act in 
good faith and employ such vigilance, sagacity, diligence and 
prudence as in general prudent [persons] of discretion and 
intelligence in like matters employ in their own affairs.”82 The duty 
of prudence helped justify the Mississippi Supreme Court’s
decision in Columbia Land Development, LLC v. Secretary of State, to 
uphold the state Secretary of State’s decision to disapprove a 
proposed lease of the state’s public tidelands for a marina and 
gaming vessel.83 The Mississippi Secretary of State’s decision came 
after the Mississippi Department of Marine Resources and the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers had issued permits for 
construction of the marina and after the Mississippi Gaming 
76. Id. at 1168 (quoting State ex rel. Kobayashi v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 735 (Haw. 
1977)).
77. Ching, 449 P.3d at 1168 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. b (AM. L.
INST. 2007); Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828 (2015)).
78. Id. (quoting United States v. White Mt. Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 475 (2003)).
79. Id. at 1178–80.
80. Id. at 1179–80; see also, Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1011 (Haw. 
2006) (concluding that the state Health Department’s constitutional public trust duty to 
protect coastal waters required Department to “not only issue permits after prescribed 
measures appear to be in compliance with state regulation, but also to ensure that the 
prescribed measures are actually being implemented”).
81. Ching, 449 P.3d at 1150.
82. Turney v. Marion Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 481 So. 2d 770, 777 (Miss. 1985) (quoting 
GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 93 (5th 
ed.1973)).
83. Columbia Land Dev., LLC v. Sec’y of State, 868 So. 2d 1006, 1008, 1015 (Miss. 
2004).
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Commission had approved the site.84 Columbia challenged the 
Secretary of State’s denial of the lease.85
The Mississippi Supreme Court decided that the public 
tidelands are held by the state in public trust and that the 
legislature authorized the Secretary of State to be the trustee for 
the public tidelands.86 The legislature, the court said, has given the 
Secretary of State the following guidance in the Tidelands Act for
making leasing decisions: “Absent a higher public interest, the 
natural state of the public trust tidelands is paramount.”87 This 
legislative guidance is only a statement of purpose or policy,
however; such guidance in other contexts might not constitute a 
binding legal rule. But because the Secretary of State is a trustee 
for these resources, the Mississippi Supreme Court explained, it 
has a trustee’s duty to exercise prudence.88 In this context, the 
court held, the duty of prudence means that the Secretary of State 
has a “duty to exercise discretion in a manner consistent with the 
public policy as stated in the Tidelands Act.”89 In short, the duty of 
prudence significantly strengthened the Secretary of State’s
statutory authority.
The Mississippi Secretary of State denied the lease for a variety 
of reasons, including the rural and remote nature of the site; the 
likelihood of pollution of the bay in which the casino would be 
located; “the relatively pristine nature of the site and 
surroundings;” and the likelihood that the casino would not be 
financially viable, further contributing to its adverse environmental 
effect.90 Columbia argued this decision was arbitrary and capricious 
because these issues had already been addressed by other agencies 
in their approvals. The Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed, citing 
the Secretary of State’s unique role as trustee for the tidelands and 
his duty as a trustee to exercise prudence in protecting the 
tidelands. It upheld the trial court’s decision that the secretary’s
84. Id. at 1009.
85. Id. at 1010–11.
86. Id. at 1011–14.
87. Id. at 1015, citing MISS. CODE. ANN. § 29-15-3(1) (2000), which provides:
It is declared to be the public policy of this state to favor the preservation of the 
natural state of the public trust tidelands and their ecosystems and to prevent the 
despoliation and destruction of them, except where specific alteration of specific 
public trust tidelands would serve a higher public interest in compliance with the 
public purposes of the public trust in which such tidelands are held.
88. Id. at 1014.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1015.
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decision was “based on the secretary’s understanding of his 
trusteeship,” and that it was not arbitrary or capricious.91
Trustees also owe beneficiaries a duty of undivided loyalty. 
Under the common law of trusts, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided 
in the terms of the trust, a trustee has a duty to administer the trust 
solely in the interest of the beneficiaries, or solely in furtherance of 
its charitable purpose.”92 Courts have used this principle to help 
determine the meaning of public trusts.
In Slocum v. Borough of Belmar,93 the New Jersey Superior Court 
held that Belmar violated its duty of loyalty under the state’s public 
trust law by using beach admission fees to pay for municipal 
expenses.94 Under New Jersey’s public trust law, the public is 
entitled to access municipally-owned dry sand areas as well as the 
wet sand beach between the high and low tide lines.95 While 
municipalities may charge access fees to public beaches, they may 
not discriminate between residents and non-residents.96 The case 
was a challenge to Belmar’s use of beach admission fees.
The court held that by using beach fees to pay municipal ex-
penses, Belmar violated its duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries of the 
public trust—those who used the beach. “A public trustee is 
endowed with the same duties and obligations as an ordinary 
trustee,” the court reasoned, including the duty of loyalty.97 The 
court explained:
The evidence in this case clearly indicates that Belmar 
breached its duty of loyalty to the public by increasing 
beach admission fees, rather than real estate taxes, in order 
to raise the borough’s general revenues. . . . It operated the 
91. Id. at 1016.
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) (AM. L. INST. 2007); see also id. § 78(1) 
cmt. b (“The trustee owes a duty to the beneficiaries to administer the affairs of the trust 
solely in the interests of the beneficiaries, and to exclude from consideration his own 
advantages and the welfare of third persons.”) (quoting GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 95 
(6th ed. 1987)) [hereinafter BOGERT, TRUSTS].
93. Slocum v. Borough of Belmar, 569 A.2d 312 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989).
94. See also Kealoha v. Machado, 315 P.3d 213 (Haw. 2013) (holding a breach of the 
duty of loyalty when “the trustees’ decision conflicts with the purpose of [the trust] or is 
made for the purpose of benefiting a non-beneficiary rather than the trust”); Day v. 
Apoliona, 616 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2010) (same result in parallel federal case); Att’y Gen. v. 
President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 213 N.E.2d 840 (Mass. 1966) (holding public trustees 
did not violate duty of loyalty when they moved bulk of library and herbarium from Arnold 
Arboretum in Boston to Cambridge). For an explanation of how Canadian courts have used 
the duty of loyalty in a public trust context for natural resources, see Stéphanie Roy, 
Fiduciary Duties Under the Trusteeship Theory: The Contribution of Canadian Case Law in Judicial 
Review of Environmental Matters, 43 VT. L. REV. 485 (2019).
95. Slocum, 569 A.2d at 315–16 (citing Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-
The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972)).
96. Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 55.
97. Slocum, 569 A.2d at 317.
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beach area as though it were a commercial business 
enterprise for the sole benefit of its taxpayers. This conduct 
resulted in surplus beach fee revenues being used to 
subsidize other municipal expenditures for the exclusive 
benefit of the residents of Belmar, rather than being set 
aside to meet future beach-related costs. These actions 
place the interest of Belmar’s residents before those of the 
beachgoers, in violation of the borough’s duty under the 
public trust doctrine.98
Finally, courts have used trust law principles to decide how 
proceeds from the sale of public trust natural resources can 
lawfully be expended. In a 1947 decision, City of Long Beach v. 
Morse,99 the California Supreme Court used trust law to help decide 
that the City of Long Beach could not use revenue100 from oil and 
gas leases of public trust tidelands for its own municipal purposes.
In 1911, the state legislature granted certain tidelands and
submerged lands within the City of Long Beach to the city in trust 
for specific purposes associated with the development of its harbor.
The legislature’s trust grant provided:
[N]one of said lands shall be used or devoted to any 
purposes other than public park, parkway, highway, 
playground, the establishment, improvement and conduct 
of a harbor and the construction, maintenance and 
operation thereon of wharves, docks, piers, slips, quays and 
other utilities, structures and appliances necessary or 
convenient for the promotion and accommodation of 
commerce and navigation . . . . 101
At issue was the use of funds derived from oil and gas leasing on 
those lands; the city sought to use the money “for general 
municipal improvements not limited to the purposes specified in 
98. Id.
99. City of Long Beach v. Morse, 188 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1947).
100. The court repeatedly refers to the moneys received from oil and gas leasing as 
“revenue,” not as royalties. E.g., id. at 18 (“The revenue in question was derived from the 
production of oil and gas from the tide lands and submerged lands . . . .”). This, of course, 
suggests that the moneys received were not just in the form of royalties but also rentals or 
other income. As discussed in detail in Part II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in PEDF II
held that the state could not use royalties from oil and gas leasing for non-trust purposes, 
but it did not decide the question of whether the expenditure of bonus and rental payments 
for non-trust purposes is permissible. The California Supreme Court’s use of “revenue” in 
City of Long Beach suggests that the trust limitation applies to not only royalties but also bo-
nus and rental payments.
101. City of Long Beach, 188 P.2d at 19 (quoting 1935 Cal. Stat. 793–94).
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the legislative grants under which the city claims title to the 
lands.”102 The city argued that the trust restriction applied only to 
the use of lands, not to income from those lands. The court 
disagreed, citing both charitable and private trust law.103 Because 
the lands are held in trust, the court said, proceeds from their sale 
or lease must also be held in trust.104 The court explained:
If the proceeds from the sale of oil and gas are regarded as 
corpus, they must be used for the purposes set forth in the 
legislative grants in trust, for the City, as trustee, clearly has 
no authority to appropriate the corpus to its own uses 
contrary to the terms of the trust. If the proceeds are 
regarded as income from trust property, the trustee, in the 
absence of a legislative provision to the contrary, has no 
more right to them than it has to the corpus.105
Even if other language in the 1911 legislative grant authorized the 
city to conduct oil and gas leasing on those lands, the court said, “it 
does not follow” that the city may use the income “for general 
municipal purposes unconnected with the expressed purposes of 
the trust.”106
City of Long Beach is not the only case in which a court has used 
trust law principles to limit how proceeds from the sale of public 
trust resources can be spent. As more fully discussed in Section
II.A, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Environmen-
tal Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth (PEDF II)107 used trust law 
principles to help decide that royalties from oil and gas leasing of 
public trust resources must be used for the purposes expressed in 
the public trust.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 20 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 238 (AM. L. INST. 1935); GEORGE 
GLEASON BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, §§ 789, 828 (1935); Provident Land Corp. v. 
Zumwalt, 85 P.2d 116, 120 (Cal. 1938) (holding rents and profits from private trust property 
are also subject to the trust); Methodist Benev. Ass’n v. Bank of Sweet Spring, 54 S.W.2d 474, 
478 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932) (holding dividends from stock held in charitable trust are part of 
trust corpus).
104. City of Long Beach, 188 P.2d at 20 (“Once it is made clear that the lands are held in 
trust, it necessarily follows that their proceeds, whether by sale or lease, are likewise subject 
to the trust.”) (quoting Zumwalt, 85 P.2d at 120).
105. Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
106. Id. at 22. While the legislature separately authorized the city to use a fraction of the 
proceeds of oil and gas drilling for its own purposes, it did so subject to the requirement 
that such expenditures must not violate the terms of the public trust. Id. at 21. But see id. at 
23–27 (Schauer, J., dissenting) (arguing (1) that the trust language did not apply to income 
from oil and gas drilling and (2) that the legislative limit on the city’s use of a fraction of oil 
and gas proceedings for its own purposes therefore did not apply). 
107. 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017)
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These cases all involve public trusts that provide some level of 
environmental protection for, or public access to, natural 
resources. In all of these cases, the incorporation of trust law into a 
public trust for natural resources strengthened the protection 
already provided by the public trust by adding structure to support 
the intended protection. But some public trusts were not created 
or designed for protecting natural resources.108 A problem occurs 
when the public trust involves natural resources but is not in any 
way intended or designed for protection of the environmental 
attributes of those resources. In these cases, the application of trust 
law principles to the public trust is not likely to provide any greater 
environmental protection.
Public school land trusts provide an example. Although these 
trusts involve natural resources, they are not public trusts for natu-
ral resources because they were not designed in any way to protect 
these resources or provide public access to them. The use of trust 
law principles to help interpret the meaning of these trusts shows 
the primacy of the text and purpose of the law creating them. The 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 1967 decision, Lassen v. Arizona ex rel.
Arizona Highway Department,109 involved the New Mexico-Arizona 
Enabling Act of 1910, which granted to Arizona 9.2 million acres in 
trust for the development and operation of schools.110 Congress 
intended that the grant “provide the most substantial support 
possible to the beneficiaries and that only those beneficiaries profit 
from the trust.”111 The Enabling Act contains detailed provisions 
concerning the transfer of school trust lands to non-state parties, 
and how the money from such transfers is to be used. These 
provisions are consistent with the trustee’s common law duty to 
manage the trust corpus on behalf of the beneficiaries so that the 
income from the trust corpus is reasonably maximized.112 But the 
statute “does not directly refer to the conditions or consequences 
108. Some public trusts have both natural resources protection and other purposes, such 
as promotion of navigation and commerce. See, e.g., supra Section I.A (discussing public 
trusts for bottomlands under navigable waterways).
109. Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Ariz. Highway Dep’t, 385 U.S. 458 (1967).
110. Id. at 460 n.2; New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act of 1910 §§ 24–29, 36 Stat. 557,
572–76 (1910).
111. Lassen, 385 U.S. at 467. These rules include, for example, requirements that the 
lands be “appraised at their true value” prior to sale, that the land is to be sold after public 
notice for at least that value “to the highest and best bidder” at a public auction, and that 
money or other receipts from the sale of the land can only be used for the purposes for 
which the land was granted in trust. Id. at 466–67; New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act § 28, 
367 Stat. at 574–75 (relevant part reproduced as an appendix in 385 U.S. at 470–74).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 181 (AM. L. INST. 1959) (“The trustee is under 
a duty to the beneficiary to use reasonable care and skill to make the trust property 
productive.”). In addition, a “trustee of land is normally under a duty to lease it or to 
manage it so that it will produce income.” Id. at cmt. a.
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of the use by the State itself of the trust lands for purposes not 
designated in the grant.”113
This case arose when the Arizona Highway Department sought 
to acquire rights of way and material sites on school trust lands.114
Because the land transfers were to another agency of the state, 
rather than a non-state party, the Enabling Act did not apply.115
The Arizona Supreme Court ordered the trustee—the State Land 
Commissioner—to grant the lands to the Department of Highways 
without compensation.116 It reasoned that “it may be conclusively 
presumed that highways constructed across trust lands always 
enhance the value of the remaining trust lands in amounts at least 
equal to the value of the areas taken.”117 The U.S. Supreme Court 
disagreed, holding that “Arizona must actually compensate the 
trust in money for the full appraised value of any material sites or 
rights of way which it obtains on or over trust lands.”118 “This 
standard,” the Court said, “most consistently reflects the essential 
purposes of the grant.”119 In a later case, the Court described Lassen
as holding that “even where the State itself is the acquisitor, the
Act’s designated beneficiaries were to derive the full benefit of the 
grant.”120
Courts around the country121 have employed that rationale to 
reach similar decisions on below-market-value sale or lease of 
school trust lands.122 While this rationale is fine for trusts designed 
to maximize financial returns to the public beneficiaries, it does 
not address the question of whether these lands may also have 
environmental, historical, archeological, or cultural values. In fact, 
it can override these values. One tension between school land 
trusts and public trusts for natural resources is the emphasis placed
in school trusts on generating a reasonable financial return. By 
113. Lassen, 385 U.S. at 461.
114. Id. at 459–61.
115. Id. at 461–65.
116. State ex rel. Ariz. Highway Dep’t. v. Lassen, 407 P.2d 747, 752 (Ariz. 1965).
117. Lassen, 385 U.S. at 460 (summarizing reasoning of Arizona Supreme Court).
118. Id. at 469.
119. Id. at 469–70.
120. Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 302 (1976).
121. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ebke v. Bd. of Educ. Lands & Funds, 47 N.W.2d 520 (Neb. 
1951); Okla. Educ. Ass’n v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230 (Okla. 1982); Cnty. of Skamania v. State, 685 
P.2d 576 (Wash. 1984).
122. This approach has been applied to public lands granted to states for university 
purposes, even when giving effect to that purpose ran counter to the state’s interest in 
creating a public park. State v. Univ. of Alaska, 624 P.2d 807 (1981). The court reached a 
similar conclusion in a later case involving lands designated by Congress as public trust 
lands for mental health programs. State v. Weiss, 706 P.2d 681, 683, 683 n.3 (Alaska 1985) 
(holding state redesignation for “general grant land” of lands designated in trust for mental 
health programs is breach of trust under “basic trust law principles”); see also Weiss v. State, 
939 P.2d 380 (1997) (approval of settlement in that case).
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contrast, public trusts for natural resources are generally intended 
to correct market failures; the value to the public of these natural 
resources generally is not recognized by the market.
The 1993 Utah Supreme Court decision in National Parks and 
Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands123 is illustrative. The 
case involved the state’s approval of an exchange of state school 
trust land within a national park for county land. The county 
sought to acquire the school trust land to pave part of a dirt road 
to improve public access to the park.124 The National Parks and 
Conservation Association (NPCA) argued “the scenic and 
recreational qualities of the park will be adversely affected” if the 
county acquired and then paved that part of the dirt road.125 In 
approving the land exchange, the Board of State Lands concluded 
that it “could not give priority to nonmonetary values because of its 
fiduciary duty to manage school trust land for the exclusive 
economic benefit of the common schools.”126
NPCA argued that the Board of State Lands erred in approving 
the land exchange because it did not prioritize “the scenic, 
aesthetic, and recreational values” of public trust lands.127 The 
Utah Supreme Court disagreed, holding that public trust law does 
not apply to school trust lands.128 While Utah law recognizes a nat-
ural resources public trust, which “protects the ecological integrity 
of public lands and their public recreational uses for the benefit of 
the public at large for some natural resources,” school trust lands 
are not among these lands.129 In contrast to public trust lands, the 
court explained, “the primary objective of the school land trust is 
to maximize the economic value of school trust lands.”130
This conflict between natural resources protection and income 
maximization plays out in other school trust contexts as well. When 
these lands contain old-growth forests, for example, the school 
trust law approach to valuation “can only hamper efforts to protect 
ecological values on state lands.”131 But school trusts were not 
established to protect natural resources.
123. Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909 (Utah 1993).
124. Id. at 911.
125. Id. at 913.
126. Id. at 916.
127. Id. at 916–17.
128. Id. at 919–21.
129. Id. at 919.
130. Id. at 920.
131. John B. Arum, Comment, Old-Growth Forests on State School Lands—Dedicated to 
Oblivion?—Private Trust Theory and the Public Trust, 65 WASH. L. REV. 151, 159 (1990).
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2. Refusal to Use Trust Law Principles When They Would 
Undermine Public Trusts
In the preceding section, some courts have used trust law 
principles to further the purposes of different public trusts for 
natural resources because they concluded that these principles 
were of assistance in doing so. But that does not mean that trust 
law principles are, or should be, applied indiscriminately to natural 
resources public trusts. In the cases below, courts also effectuated 
the purpose and structure of various public trusts or public trust-
like laws for natural resources. But they did so by refusing to apply 
trust principles—frequently private trust law principles—that 
would undermine public trusts for natural resources or laws akin to 
such public trusts.
In City of Coronado v. San Diego Unified Port District,132 the 
California Court of Appeals ruled that trust law did not prevent the 
California legislature from revoking a public trust grant of 
tidelands to the City of Coronado. In the same act, the legislature 
regranted those tidelands in public trust to the San Diego Unified 
Port District, which includes not only Coronado but also the other 
cities on San Diego Bay. Coronado argued, citing trust law, that a 
grant of property in trust “is irrevocable unless an express power of 
revocation has been reserved” and that the legislature had not 
reserved a power of revocation.133 The California Court of Appeals 
disagreed, explaining that “private trust principles cannot be called 
upon to nullify an act of the Legislature or modify its duty, under 
the California Constitution . . . to do all things necessary to the 
execution and the administration of the public trust.”134
The court explained that this outcome is essential to the state’s
effective administration of its public trust for these tidelands.
“[W]hen the State acts in any way to alter or amend a statutory 
grant in trust made by it, it acts both as [settlor] and in behalf of 
the beneficiaries of the trust,” the court said.135 “To hold that the 
State of California through its Legislature is without power to 
change from a small municipal trustee to a port district comprised 
132. City of Coronado v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 227 Cal. App. 2d 455, 481 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1964).
133. Id. at 473 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 2280).
134. Id. (citing CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 2; Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 44 Cal. 2d 199 
(1955)); see also id. at 473–74 (“Viewing the subject from a slightly different aspect no grant 
of lands covered by navigable waters can be made which will impair the power of a 
subsequent Legislature to regulate enjoyment of the public right.”) (citing Ill. Cent. R. R. 
Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)); Evans v. City of Johnstown, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199, 208 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1978) (“While the use of the name ‘public trust’ may suggest duties similar to 
those under a private trust, that interpretation is not feasible.”).
135. Coronado, 227 Cal. App. 2d at 474–75.
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of five municipalities would be to place San Diego harbor beyond 
the direction and control of the State for the benefit of the general 
public.”136
In Owsichek v. State, Guide Licensing & Control Board,137 the Alaska 
Supreme Court applied a “close scrutiny” standard, rather than the 
trust law standard of abuse of discretion, to legislation that allowed 
the state’s Guide Licensing and Control Board “to grant hunting 
guides ‘exclusive guide areas,’ geographic areas in which only the 
designated guide may lead hunts and from which all other guides 
are excluded.”138 Owsichek, a licensed guide, challenged the 
legislation after being granted an area he regarded as 
“unhuntable.”139 He based much of his claim on Article VIII, 
Section 3 of the Alaska Constitution, which provides: “Wherever 
occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are 
reserved to the people for common use.”140
The Alaska Supreme Court held that the new legislation violated 
this provision of the state constitution, which is also called the 
common use clause. In prior cases, the court explained, “we have 
indicated an intent to apply the common use clause in a way that 
strongly protects public access to natural resources.”141 After 
reviewing the constitutional history of the common use clause, the 
court stated that “the minimum requirement of this duty is a 
prohibition against any monopolistic grants or special privileges.”142
This history “reinforces our conclusion that grants of exclusive 
rights to harvest natural resources listed in the common use clause 
should be subjected to close scrutiny.”143 The court explained:
We conclude that exclusive guide areas and joint use 
areas fall within the category of grants prohibited by the 
common use clause. These areas allow one guide to 
exclude all other guides from leading hunts professionally 
in “his” area. These grants are based primarily on use, 
occupancy and investment, favoring established guides at 
the expense of new entrants in the market, such as 
136. Id. at 474.
137. Owsichek v. State, Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1988).
138. Id. at 489.
139. Id. at 491.
140. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
141. Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 492.
142. Id. at 496.
143. Id. at 494.
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Owsichek. To grant such a special privilege based primarily 
on seniority runs counter to the notion of ‘common use.’144
In another case, Brooks v. Wright, the Alaska Supreme Court 
explained its standard of review in Owsichek: “[A]lthough trust law 
dictates that the acts of a trustee should be reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, we have held that grants of exclusive rights to harvest 
natural resources listed in the common use clause are subject to 
close scrutiny.”145 To vindicate the purpose of the common use 
clause, the court refused to apply trust law.
Brooks provides another example of a court’s refusal to apply 
trust law to a public-trust-like law. It involved a ballot initiative in 
Alaska that would have prohibited the use of snares to trap wolves.
Wright and others sought to remove the initiative from the ballot.
They based their argument on Article VIII, Sections 3 and 4 of the 
Alaska constitution.146 These provisions, they argued, “establish a 
‘public trust’ for management of the state’s wildlife, with the State 
of Alaska as ‘trustee’ and the people of Alaska as the intended 
beneficiaries.”147 They then invoked trust law to claim that the state 
legislature, as part of its fiduciary duty, retains “exclusive law-
making authority over natural resource issues.”148 As a result, they 
argued, a ballot initiative in which the public decided this question 
was unlawful.
The Alaska Supreme Court held otherwise, concluding that the 
ballot initiative was lawful.149 To begin with, it said that while Article 
VIII “does not explicitly create a public trust,” it creates a “trust-like 
relationship.”150 As the court later explained, it “used the analogy 
of a public trust [in Brooks] to describe the nature of the state’s
duties [under Article VIII] with respect to wildlife and other 
natural resources meant for common use.”151  In applying this 
analogy, the Brooks court reasoned, “the applicability of private 
trust law depends greatly on both the type of trust created and the 
144. Id. at 496.
145. Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1032 (Alaska 1999).
146. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3 is quoted in the text accompanying supra note 140; id.
at § 4 (“Fish, forests, wildlife, grasslands, and all other replenishable resources belonging to 
the State shall be utilized, developed, and maintained on the sustained yield principle, 
subject to preferences among beneficial uses.”).
147. Brooks, 971 P.2d at 1031.
148. Id.
149. In an earlier order, in August 1998, the court permitted the ballot initiative to go 
forward, stating that an opinion would follow. In November 1998, the ballot initiative was 
defeated. The court issued its opinion in this case in January 1999. Id. at 1027.
150. Id. at 1033.
151. Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1099 n.57 (Alaska 
2014) (quoting Brooks, 971 P.2d at 1033).
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intent of those creating the trust.”152 In some cases, it is appropriate 
to use private trust principles. For instance, the court said, it is 
appropriate to apply private trust law to trust lands granted by the 
federal government to the state for public school purposes.153
Wright went further, arguing that “private trust law should be 
applied wholesale to the public trust doctrine.”154 The court 
answered that this conclusion is not consistent with the court’s own 
precedent.155 “[W]hile general principles of trust law do provide 
some guidance, they do not supersede the plain language of 
statutory and constitutional provisions when determining the 
scope of the state’s fiduciary duty or authority.”156 Alaska’s law on 
this public trust-like relationship, the court held, does not grant 
the legislature exclusive law-making authority over natural 
resources.157 The “purpose of the public trust doctrine,” the court 
explained, is “not to grant the legislature ultimate authority over 
natural resource management, but rather to prevent the state from 
giving out ‘exclusive grants or special privilege as was so frequently 
the case in ancient royal tradition.’ ”158 Moreover, “general trust law 
should not be applied to the public trust doctrine in a way that 
limits or destroys the democratic process.”159 The court explained:
[A]pplication of private trust principles may be 
counterproductive to the goals of the trust relationship in 
the context of natural resources. For instance, private trusts 
generally require the trustee to maximize economic yield 
from the trust property, using reasonable care and skill. But 
Article VIII requires that natural resources be managed for 
the benefit of all people, under the assumption that both 
development and preservation may be necessary to provide 
for future generations, and that income generation is not 
the sole purpose of the trust relationship.160






158. Id. at 1031 (quoting Owsichek v. State, Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 
488, 493 (Alaska 1988)).
159. Id. at 1033 (“It would be a strict violation of democratic principle for the original 
voters and legislators of a state to limit, through a trust, the choices of the voters and 
legislators of today.”) (quoting James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust 
Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENV’T L. 527, 544 (1989)).
160. Id. at 1032 (citations omitted).
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The Alaska Supreme Court’s distinction between the purposes of a 
private trust and the purposes of a public trust, of course, is 
essential to the effective implementation of many public trusts for 
natural resources. It also provides a key reason for refusing to 
apply at least some trust principles, particularly private trust prin-
ciples, to public trusts.
C. Charitable Trusts Versus Private Trusts
The potential for trust law to help interpret the meaning of 
public trust law does not automatically answer a basic question: 
which trust law? As we have seen, a great many trust principles ap-
ply to all traditional trusts—including the basic structure of trusts; 
the general duty of trustees to adhere to the terms of the trust; the 
trustee’s duties of prudence and loyalty toward beneficiaries; and 
the duty to monitor trust property. When courts apply trust princi-
ples to public trusts for natural resources, they often apply these 
principles.
But other trust law principles apply only to certain kinds of 
trusts. As trust lawyers know well, there are a variety of different 
kinds of trusts, each with unique rules. It is hornbook law that 
there are two basic types of express trusts, private and charitable.161
Although private and charitable trusts do not exhaust the range of 
possible options for help in interpreting the public trust, they 
represent major categories. They also demonstrate that the 
question—which trust law?—could in at least some circumstances 
have more than one answer. In fact, public trust law for natural 
resources in some states draws from both charitable and private 
trust law. When courts are forced to choose between charitable 
trust law and private trust law to help interpret public trusts for 
natural resources, they should strongly consider charitable trust 
law.
Charitable trusts and private trusts are different in at least four  
major ways. First, they have different purposes. Private trusts are 
used to create financial advantages or benefits for individuals or 
corporations.162 They are often referred to simply as trusts.163 A
charitable trust, by contrast, is intended to “accomplish a 
substantial amount of social benefit to the public or some 
161. BOGERT, TRUSTS, supra note 92, § 45. There are also two different categories of 
implied trusts—resulting trusts (§§ 71–76) and constructive trusts (§§ 77–87). But they do 
not appear to be significant here.
162. Id. at § 45.
163. See, e.g., JULIEANNE E. STEINBACHER & SAMANTHA K. WOLFE, PENNSYLVANIA TRUST 
GUIDE: A HANDBOOK FOR TRUSTEES AND THEIR ADVISORS (4th ed. 2019).
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reasonably large class thereof.”164 The purposes of a charitable trust 
can include poverty relief, education, “promotion of health,” or 
any other purpose that is “designed to accomplish objects that are 
beneficial to the community—i.e., to the public or indefinite 
members thereof—without also serving what amount to private 
trust purposes . . . . ”165 Many charitable trusts involve public 
parks.166
Second, charitable trusts differ from private trusts in the 
definiteness of who is affected. Those affected by charitable trusts 
tend to be the public or some class of persons that are not 
specifically identified by name.167 By contrast, the beneficiaries of a 
private trust are “specified persons who are designated as 
beneficiaries of the trust.”168 The individuals who benefit from a 
charitable trust are not the beneficiaries of a charitable trust. If a 
charitable trust “is set up to aid the poor of the city of Yorkville, the 
residents of that city who are from time to time selected to receive 
food, clothing and the like are not beneficiaries of the charitable 
trust but are merely the means through which the public receives 
benefits.”169 The public nature of a charitable trust is underscored 
by the fact that the state attorney general, a public official, is nearly 
always responsible for enforcing the trust, rather than the 
individuals affected by the trust.170
Third, private trusts tend to be limited in duration by the rule 
against perpetuities in states that still recognize the rule.
Charitable trusts, unaffected by that rule, can be perpetual.171
These three differences have all been subject to extensive 
litigation.172
164. BOGERT, TRUSTS, supra note 92, § 54.
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 & cmt. a, at 9–10 (AM. L. INST. 2007).
166. See, e.g., Kapiolani Park Pres. Soc. v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 751 P.2d 1022 (Haw. 
1988); State v. Rand, 366 A.2d 183 (Me. 1976); Schaeffer v. Newberry, 50 N.W.2d 477 (Minn. 
1951).
167. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT & AMY MORRIS HESS, BOGERT’S 
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 363 (2020) [hereinafter BOGERT ET AL.] (“Some 
[charitable trusts] are completely uncertain in that respect throughout their existence; 
others are partly or at times definite and partly indefinite; and in rare cases the persons 
concerned may at all times be identifiable and definite and yet the element of public 
interest may be supplied through the large size of the group.”).
168. Olivas v. Bd. of Nat’l Missions of Presbyterian Church, 405 P.2d 481, 485 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1965) (“[T]here cannot be a private trust unless there is a beneficiary who is definitely 
ascertainable within the period of the rule against perpetuities.” (citing GEORGE T. BOGERT,
TRUST & TRUSTEES § 362 (1946)).
169. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 167.
170. Id.; Degiacomo v. City of Quincy, 63 N.E.3d 365, 371–72 (Mass. 2016).
171. See, e.g., Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 46 A.3d 473, 489 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2012); Hornets Nest Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Cannon Found., Inc., 339 S.E.2d
26, 29–30 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
172. See supra notes 162–71.
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Fourth and finally, in addition to these trust law differences, 
there is a tax law difference between charitable and private trusts.
Charitable trusts are entitled to different and more beneficial tax 
consequences than private trusts.173
In many ways, public trusts for natural resources are like 
perpetual charitable trusts.174 Both are intended to benefit the 
public or some part of the public. Both are of unlimited duration. 
Both involve a large and unnamed class of beneficiaries. And both 
necessarily require the trustee to protect and maintain the trust 
corpus so that it can be available to the public in perpetuity.
Indeed, courts have sometimes described charitable trusts as a 
form of public trust.175
Perpetual charitable trusts, however, are not the same as public 
trusts. Indeed, in some other ways, public trusts are more like 
private trusts. Perhaps the most important difference is who can 
sue to enforce the trust. While charitable trusts are primarily 
enforced by a state’s attorney general, private trusts generally can 
be enforced by anyone who benefits from the trust. Similarly, 
members of the public may sue to enforce a public trust.176
Still, the similarities between public trusts and charitable trusts 
are greater than the similarities between public trusts and private 
trusts.177 That does not mean that courts should automatically 
173. RICHARD L. FOX, CHARITABLE GIVING: TAXATION, PLANNING, AND STRATEGIES
(2008).
174. Edith Brown Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity, 11 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 495, 503–04 (1984).
175. See, e.g., Hallinan v. Hearst, 66 P. 17, 19 (Cal. 1901) (treating public trusts and 
charitable trusts as synonymous); Troutman v. De Boissiere Odd Fellows’ Orphans’ Home & 
Indus. Sch. Ass’n, 71 P. 286, 300 (Kan. 1903) (“The definition of and distinction between 
private and public trusts or charities here made is accepted by text-writers and courts the 
world over as correct.”); Nixon v. Brown, 214 P. 524, 530 (Nev. 1923) (contrasting private 
trust with “charitable public trust”); Frost Nat’l Bank v. Boyd, 188 S.W.2d 199, 207 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1945) (“A ‘charitable trust’ is a ‘public trust.’ “).
176. See, e.g., Price v. Akaka, 3 F.3d 1220, 1224–25 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing common law of 
trusts to hold that a federal public trust “by its nature creates a federally enforceable right 
for its beneficiaries to maintain an action against the trustee in breach of the trust”); 
Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 1, 18 (Ill. 1974) (“If the ‘public trust’
doctrine is to have any meaning or vitality at all, the members of the public, at least 
taxpayers who are the beneficiaries of that trust, must have the right and standing to enforce 
it. To tell them that they must wait upon governmental action is often an effectual denial of 
the right for all time.”); see also Parsons v. Walker, 328 N.E.2d 920, 926 (Ill. App. 1975) (not-
ing that the circumstances, rather than the label attached to the trust at the time it is creat-
ed, determine whether a trust is a public trust or a charitable trust).
177. See Turnipseed et al., supra note 13, at 16 n.90 (2009) (“Charitable trusts are a 
superior analogy to public trusts than private trusts, because, like public trusts, they too 
benefit numerous and generally unidentified communities or citizenries and may be of 
indefinite durations. Private trust instruments, on the other hand, generally specify the 
beneficiaries and are of limited duration.”); Peter Manus, To a Candidate in Search of an 
Environmental Theme: Promote the Public Trust, 19 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 315, 324 (2000) (“[Public 
trust] framework is particularly analogous to that of a charitable trust, which may 
incorporate a public purpose, government trustee, and generalized beneficiaries.”).
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privilege a charitable trust principle over a private trust principle 
in defining the duties of a public trustee for natural resources.
Nevertheless, it does suggest that charitable trust principles, 
particularly those that apply to perpetual charitable trusts, are 
more likely than private trust principles to further public trusts for 
natural resources.
Two broader points emerge from this analysis. Most obviously, 
conflation of the two meanings of private trust law in the context 
of public trusts for natural resources can lead courts and lawyers to 
view traditional trust law in a misleading way. If courts or lawyers 
view all of trust law as the law of noncharitable trusts, then their 
choice of trust law principles to help interpret public trusts for 
natural resources is greatly limited. Not only do they miss a whole 
set of trust principles that apply to all trusts, they also miss the law 
of charitable trusts. Put differently, they are not even considering 
what is likely to be the most relevant and important trust law. In 
addition, there will sometimes be cases where courts have to 
choose between private trust law, on one hand, and charitable trust 
law and general trust law, on the other, to help interpret a particu-
lar public trust. We now turn to a case that involves both of these 
points.
II. PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE 
FOUNDATION V. COMMONWEALTH
In 1971, near the beginning of the modern environmental era, 
the voters of Pennsylvania overwhelmingly approved an 
environmental rights amendment to the state constitution.178 The 
amendment has two parts. The first sentence of article I, section 
27, of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: “The people have a 
right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the 
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.”179
The last two sentences recognize a constitutional public trust for 
certain natural resources: “Pennsylvania’s public natural resources 
are the common property of all the people, including generations 
yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall 
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”180
178. John C. Dernbach & Edmund J. Sonnenberg, A Legislative History of Article I, Section 
27 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 24 WIDENER L.J. 181, 273–79 (2015). 
The vote was 1,021,342 in favor and 259,797 against, id. at 280, which is a margin of four to 
one.
179. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
180. Id.
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In Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth 
(PEDF III),181 the Commonwealth Court interpreted private trust 
law to decide that the state could spend some bonus and rental 
payment money from oil and gas leasing on state forest and park-
land, which is constitutional public trust property, for non-trust 
purposes. That decision is the ultimate focus of this part of the Ar-
ticle and the case study for the Article as a whole. But to under-
stand the case, it is first necessary to have some additional back-
ground.
Section 27 played only a minimal role in environmental 
protection for more than four decades because of a 1973 case, 
Payne v. Kassab, which substituted a three-part test for the text of 
the amendment.182 In 2013, in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held unconstitutional several 
provisions of a state statute governing shale gas extraction.183 Three 
justices, a plurality of the seven-member court, based their decision 
on section 27. The plurality opinion, written by then-Chief Justice 
Ronald Castille, contains a detailed exposition of the text of 
section 27 and how it should be applied.184 Still, this opinion was 
signed by only three of the court’s seven justices and did not 
constitute binding precedent on section 27.185 Four years later, in 
2017, in the landmark case of Pennsylvania Environmental Defense 
Foundation v. Commonwealth (PEDF II), a majority of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held several other statutes unconsti-
tutional under section 27, applying much of the Robinson Township
plurality opinion.186
181. 214 A.3d 748 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019).
182. The test was set forth in Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), 
aff’d on other grounds, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976):
The court’s role must be to test the decision under review by a threefold standard: 
(1) Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations relevant to 
the protection of the Commonwealth’s public natural resources? (2) Does the 
record demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce the environmental incursion to 
a minimum? (3) Does the environmental harm which will result from the 
challenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the benefits to be derived 
therefrom that to proceed further would be an abuse of discretion?
For a detailed explanation of the effect of, and case law under, the Payne v. Kassab test, see
John C. Dernbach & Marc Prokopchak, Recognition of Environmental Rights for Pennsylvania 
Citizens: A Tribute to Chief Justice Castille, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 335 (2015).
183. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013); see also John C. 
Dernbach, James R. May & Kenneth T. Kristl, Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania: Examination and Implications, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1169 (2015).
184. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 947–63.
185. The fourth vote for holding parts of the statute unconstitutional came from Justice 
Baer, who based his opinion on substantive due process. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1000 
(Baer, J., concurring).
186. PEDF II, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017).
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PEDF II had its origins in two major changes that occurred in 
Pennsylvania’s longstanding oil and gas leasing program on public 
lands. For well over half a century, the program involved relatively 
small wells that brought several million dollars per year to the 
Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR) and 
its predecessor agencies. Under the state statute in effect at the 
time, the state spent the money on a variety of conservation 
projects.187 When private companies discovered how to recover 
large amounts of gas from shale, DCNR was able to enter into 
leases that brought in hundreds of millions of dollars per year. At 
about the same time, in 2008, a major recession caused 
Pennsylvania to incur significant budget deficits. Both the 
governor and the legislature made a series of decisions that 
allocated about half of the oil and gas leasing money to the 
General Fund to help balance the budget. The state received $926 
million in oil and gas lease revenues between Fiscal Years 2008–
2009 and 2014–2015. DCNR received about half of that. The rest 
was spent as part of the General Fund.188
In Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth 
(PEDF I), PEDF sued the state in the Commonwealth Court, 
seeking declaratory relief that the variety of legislative and 
administrative decisions to lease state land for oil and gas 
development, and divert royalties received from oil and gas leasing 
to the General Fund in 2009–2015, violated the public trust 
provisions of section 27.189 The Commonwealth Court, applying the 
three-part Payne test to interpret section 27 because the Robinson 
Township decision tacitly preserved that test, granted the 
Commonwealth’s request for summary relief.190
This part first explains the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in PEDF II on the use of royalties received from 
oil and gas leasing on state lands. In that case, the court remanded 
to the Commonwealth Court a question about the use of bonus 
and rental payments from oil and gas leasing. This part then 
describes the Commonwealth Court’s decision on that issue in 
PEDF III.
187. See infra note 276.
188. PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 925.
189. PEDF I, 108 A3d 140 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015).
190. Id. at 172–73.
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A.  Pennsylvania Supreme Court: Royalties from Oil and Gas Leasing
In PEDF II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the 
commonwealth court’s decision and held that the use of royalties 
from oil and gas leasing for non-trust purposes violated section 
27.191 The court began its analysis by addressing the three-part test 
that the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court first used in Payne v. 
Kassab in 1973. Stating that the test “is unrelated to the text of 
section 27 and the trust principles animating it,” and that it “strips 
the constitutional provision of its meaning,” the court rejected the 
test as the proper standard to apply.192 It held that the 
interpretation of section 27 should be guided in substantial part by 
the text of the amendment itself.193
This, by itself, was a “sea-change.”194 The text had never mattered 
before and had not been read seriously. The three-part Payne test 
had been used for so long, and had substituted so effectively for 
the text of section 27, that lawyers, judges, and public and private 
decisionmakers were now obliged to look at section 27 “for the first 
time.”195
Article I of Pennsylvania’s constitution, in which section 27 is 
located, is Pennsylvania’s Declaration of Rights, the state’s analog 
to the U.S. Bill of Rights. A careful analysis of the text,196 the court 
said, showed that section 27 recognizes two distinct rights. The 
first, which is contained in the first sentence, is a right to certain 
qualities or values in the environment. The second, which is 
contained in the remaining two sentences, is a right to have the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania conserve and maintain public 
natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations.
These two sentences, in effect, create a constitutional public trust 
for those resources.197 Under these two sentences, the court noted, 
the Commonwealth is the trustee.198 The corpus, or body, of the 
191. PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 939; see also Dernbach et. al., supra note 29, at 822–23.
192. PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 930.
193. Id. at 916 (“Because state parks and forests, including the oil and gas minerals 
therein, are part of the corpus of Pennsylvania’s environmental public trust, we hold that 
the Commonwealth, as trustee, must manage them according to the plain language of Sec-
tion 27, which imposes fiduciary duties consistent with Pennsylvania trust law.”).
194. Id. at 940 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
195. T.S. ELIOT, Little Gidding, in FOUR QUARTETS 39 (1943):
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
196. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
197. PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 931–32.
198. Id.
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trust is public natural resources, which the court said includes state 
parks and forests, as well as the oil and gas they contain.199 The 
people, including present and future generations, are “the named 
beneficiaries” of this trust.200 The court also explained that “all 
agencies and entities of the Commonwealth government, both 
statewide and local,” have a constitutional trust responsibility.201
The court then explained the basic duties of the Commonwealth 
as a trustee:
Pennsylvania’s environmental trust thus imposes two basic 
duties on the Commonwealth as the trustee. First, the 
Commonwealth has a duty to prohibit the degradation, 
diminution, and depletion of our public natural resources, 
whether these harms might result from direct state action 
or from the actions of private parties. Second, the 
Commonwealth must act affirmatively via legislative action 
to protect the environment.202
But the court did not limit the standard of judicial review to the 
text of section 27. Instead, it said: “[W]hen reviewing challenges to 
the constitutionality of Commonwealth actions under section 27, 
the proper standard of judicial review lies in the text of section 27 
itself as well as the underlying principles of Pennsylvania trust law in 
effect at the time of its enactment.”203
The use of trust language in the public trust part of section 27,
the court said, indicates the value of drawing on pre-existing trust 
law principles to determine their meaning.204 Thus, in exercising its 
public trust duties, the Commonwealth is bound by the general 
trust duties of prudence, exercising “such care and skill as a man of 
ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own 
property”; loyalty, managing the trust corpus “so as to accomplish 
the trust’s purposes for the benefit of the trust’s beneficiaries”; and 
impartiality, managing “the trust so as to give all of the 
beneficiaries due regard for their respective interests in light of the 
purposes of the trust.”205
The court added that a trustee’s discretion under the public 
trust is bound by the terms of the trust. “Although a trustee is 
199. Id. at 916.
200. Id. at 931–32.
201. Id. at 931 n.23.
202. Id. at 933 (citing Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 957–58 (Pa. 
2013)).
203. PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 930 (emphasis added).
204. Id. at 932.
205. Id. at 932–33 (citations omitted).
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empowered to exercise discretion with respect to the proper 
treatment of the corpus of the trust, that discretion is limited by 
the purpose of the trust and the trustee’s fiduciary duties,” the 
court said, citing trust law.206 Even when the trustee says it is acting 
in other ways to protect the beneficiaries, the trustee cannot use 
trust assets in these other ways.207
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then used trust law principles 
to help answer two arguments by the Commonwealth that “the 
revenue obtained from the disposition of trust assets need not be 
returned to the corpus of the trust or otherwise dedicated to trust 
purposes.”208 First, the Commonwealth argued, “the Environmental 
Rights Amendment is ‘silent’ as to the use of proceeds from the 
sale of natural resources, and ‘addresses neither the appropriations 
process nor funding for conservation purposes.’ ”209 “This is plainly 
inaccurate,” the court responded, “as Section 27 expressly creates a 
trust, and pursuant to trust law in effect at the time of the 
enactment, proceeds from the sale of trust assets are part of the 
corpus of the trust.”210 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied 
on both private trust law and charitable trust law.211 The court 
explained how the constitutional text and trust law principles work 
together in this context:
[T]he creation of a trust in the Environmental Rights 
Amendment obviates the need for additional language 
indicating that funds should be dedicated for a specific 
purpose. Section 27 itself establishes that the purpose of 
the trust is to ‘‘conserve and maintain’’ the public natural 
resources and basic trust principles require that the proceeds from 
their sale remain part of the corpus.212
206. Id. at 933 (citing Struthers Coal & Coke Co. v. Union Tr. Co., 75 A. 986, 988 (Pa. 
1910); In re Sparks’ Estate, 196 A 48, 57 (Pa. 1938)).
207. PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 933. For example, a private trust may provide only for the 
education of the beneficiary. If the beneficiary has a serious and expensive health issue, the 
trustee cannot spend trust money on the best medical experts without a court order, even if 




211. Id. at 933–35 (citing In re McKeown’s Estate, 106 A. 189, 190 (Pa. 1919) (applying 
private trust law and finding that “[b]eing a sale of assets in the corpus of the trust, 
presumptively all of the proceeds are principal”); Bolton v. Stillwagon, 190 A.2d 105, 109 
(1963) (applying charitable trust law and holding that “where the relation of trustee and 
[beneficiary] has once been established as to certain property in the hands of the trustee, 
no mere change of trust property from one form to another will destroy the relation”).
212. PEDF II, 161 A.3d 933 n.26 (emphasis added).
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The court also used that approach to reject an argument that 
the constitutional public trust under section 27 should be 
interpreted to follow the public trust law that has been applied by 
other courts and jurisdictions.213 As explained in greater detail 
below, Justice Baer’s concurring and dissenting opinion argued 
that, under “the classic public trust doctrine,” the resources 
themselves are subject to the public trust but not proceeds from 
the sale of those resources.214 The majority, however, explained 
that Pennsylvania is not governed by this law:
At most, the public trust doctrine provides a framework for 
states to draft their own public trust provisions, which (like 
many trust instruments) will ultimately be interpreted by 
the state courts. In Pennsylvania, established private trust 
principles provide this Court with the necessary tools to 
properly interpret the trust created by Section 27.215
The Commonwealth’s second argument was that the section 27 
phrase, “for the benefit of all the people,” means that the General 
Assembly can “direct the proceeds from oil and gas development 
toward any uses that benefit all the people of the Commonwealth, 
even if those uses do nothing to ‘conserve and maintain’ our 
public natural resources.”216 Responding that it was “wholly 
unconvinced,” the court said the phrase could not be pulled out of 
the context in which it is used in section 27, which requires the 
Commonwealth to conserve and maintain public natural resources 
for the benefit of present and future generations.217 The 
Commonwealth, the court said, must use public natural resources 
as a trustee, and not as a “mere proprietor.”218
The Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation argued 
that all proceeds from oil and gas leasing—not just royalties, but 
also bonuses and rents—are subject to the public trust. The court 
said it could not decide that question because it had not been 
sufficiently argued and briefed by the parties.219 Because proceeds 
213. Id. at 934–35.
214. Id. at 944.
215. Id. at 933 n.26. In general, public trust laws vary from state to state; there is no sin-
gle version of a public trust for natural resources. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
On the use of the term “private trust law” in this quotation, see infra notes 245, 295–97 and 
accompanying text.
216. Id. at 934.
217. Id. at 934–35.
218. Id. at 935, 939.
219. Id. at 935 (“[T]he record on appeal is undeveloped regarding the purpose of up-
front bonus bid payments, and thus no factual basis exists on which to determine how to 
categorize this revenue.”).
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from the sale of the trust corpus are subject to public trust 
restrictions, the court held, royalties based on gross production 
from oil and gas wells are subject to the public trust.220 The court 
cited a private trust law case for the proposition that “rents from 
realty held by a trust have traditionally been treated as income 
(and payable to the beneficiary) rather than principle.”221 The 
court said it did not know how to categorize other receipts to the 
state from leasing, particularly bonus and annual rental fees.222 It 
therefore remanded that issue to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth 
Court.223 The commonwealth court, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court said, must make that decision “in strict accordance and 
fidelity to Pennsylvania trust principles”224 that were “in effect at the 
time” of section 27’s enactment.225 The court added: “Oil and gas 
leases may not be drafted in ways that remove assets from the 
corpus of the trust or otherwise deprive the trust beneficiaries (the 
people, including future generations) of the funds necessary to 
conserve and maintain the public natural resources.”226
The court then addressed the constitutionality of two sections of 
the Fiscal Code that allocated oil and gas royalty receipts to the 
General Fund. The court held both provisions to be 
unconstitutional on their face,227 explaining that “royalties—
monthly payments based on the gross production of oil and gas at 
each well—are unequivocally proceeds from the sale of oil and gas 
resources.”228 One provision authorized $50 million in royalty 
receipts to DCNR in the Oil and Gas Lease Fund to carry out the 
various conservation provisions of the 1955 Oil and Gas Lease 
220. Id.
221. Id. (citing In re Estate of Rosenblum, 328 A.2d 158, 163 (Pa. 1974)). That case 
involved four trusts, one for each of four beneficiaries. Under each, one beneficiary was the 
life tenant of the trust. “The net income from each trust was to be paid to the life tenant 
during his or her lifetime, and on the death of the life tenant, the corpus was to be 
distributed free of the trust to his or her descendants, per stirpes.” Id. at 160. The court held 
that the trustee did not err by paying rental income from the trust corpus to the life tenants. 
Id. at 163. “In general, rents received from realty held in trust are income, and except as 
otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, they are payable to the beneficiary entitled to 
income from the trust.” Id.
222. PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 935–36.
223. Id. at 936 (“[I]t is up to the Commonwealth Court, in the first instance and in strict 
accordance and fidelity to Pennsylvania trust principles, to determine whether these funds 
belong in the corpus of the Section 27 trust.”).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 930.
226. Id. at 936.
227. Id. at 938, 938 n.31 (“A statute is facially unconstitutional only where no set of 
circumstances exist under which the statute would be valid.”).
228. Id. at 935.
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Fund Act, which authorized oil and gas leasing on state lands.229
This provision also required DCNR to “give preference to the 
operation and maintenance of State parks and forests.”230 The 
other provision stated that no other royalty money in this fund 
“may be expended unless appropriated or transferred to the 
General Fund by the General Assembly from the fund.”231 This 
other provision also required the General Assembly to “consider”
allocating some of the money to municipalities affected by shale 
gas wells.232
The court faulted the General Assembly not only for failure to 
consider its section 27 responsibilities233 but also for breach of the 
public trust.234 In its brief, the Commonwealth admitted “that 
revenue generated by oil and gas leases is now spent in a multitude 
of ways entirely unrelated to the conservation and maintenance of 
our public natural resources.”235 Because “these legislative 
enactments permit the trustee to use trust assets for non-trust 
purposes,” they constitute “a clear violation of the most basic of a 
trustee’s fiduciary obligations.”236 The $50 million allocation to 
DCNR, the court explained, requires DCNR to give preference to 
maintenance of state parks and forests, “rather than to 
conservation purposes.”237 The requirement to “consider”
allocating royalty funds to municipalities affected by shale gas is 
insufficient to meet the Commonwealth’s substantive 
responsibilities.238 The court also held: “To the extent the 
remainder of the Fiscal Code amendments transfer proceeds from 
the sale of trust assets to the General Fund, they are likewise 
constitutionally infirm.”239
The court nonetheless made clear that diversion of funds from 
the Lease Fund or from DCNR’s exclusive control would not, by 
itself, constitute a breach of the constitutional public trust:
229. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1603-E (2019) (providing “for conservation, recreation, dams, 
and flood control; authorizing the Secretary of Forests and Waters to determine the need 
for and location of such projects and to acquire the necessary land”).
230. Id.
231. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1602-E (2019).
232. Id.
233. PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 937 (“On their face, these amendments lack any indication that 
the Commonwealth is required to contemplate, let alone reasonably exercise,” its section 27 
trust responsibilities.); id. at 938 (“[T]here is no indication that the General Assembly 
considered the purposes of the public trust . . . .”).
234. Id. at 938 (“[T]here is no indication that the General Assembly . . . exercised 
reasonable care in managing the royalties in a manner consistent with its Section 27 trustee 
duties.”).
235. Id. at 937.
236. Id. at 938 (citing Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 950 (Pa. 2013)).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 937.
239. Id. at 938 (emphasis omitted).
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[T]he legislature violates Section 27 when it diverts 
proceeds from oil and gas development to a non-trust 
purpose without exercising its fiduciary duties as trustee. 
The DCNR is not the only agency committed to conserving 
and maintaining our public natural resources, and the 
General Assembly would not run afoul of the constitution 
by appropriating trust funds to some other initiative or 
agency dedicated to effectuating Section 27.240
Justice Baer filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. He said 
that he was in “full agreement” with the “dismantling” of the Payne
test.”241 He also agreed that, in managing public natural resources, 
the Commonwealth trustees must adhere to the trustee’s duties of 
loyalty, impartiality, and prudence.242 He nonetheless dissented 
from “the primary holding of the case declaring various fiscal 
enactments unconstitutional or potentially unconstitutional based 
upon the Majority’s conclusion that the proceeds from the sale of 
natural resources are part of the ‘trust corpus’ protected by section 
27.”243 Section 27’s “conserve and maintain” requirement applies to 
public natural resources, he contended, “not the money gained 
from the resources.”244 Essentially, he argued the majority used 
private trust law245 to reach the conclusion that royalties from the 
leasing of public natural resources are also part of the trust corpus.
The “classic public trust doctrine”—reflected in the particular pub-
lic trust involved in Illinois Central—does not contemplate this 
outcome, he wrote, nor does section 27’s text and legislative 
history.246
B. Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court: Bonus and Rental Payments from 
Oil and Gas Leasing
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that royalties from 
oil and gas leasing are subject to the section 27 public trust, it 
240. Id. at 939.
241. Id. at 940 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
242. Id. at 945–46.
243. Id. at 940.
244. Id. at 946.
245. While Justice Baer uses the term “private trust” repeatedly through his opinion, for 
example, id. at 940, 942–43, 945, there is no indication in his opinion that he is using the 
term to distinguish it from charitable trust law. In fact, his endorsement of the general trust 
law principles of loyalty, impartiality, and prudence would seem to preclude a reading of his 
opinion as limited to noncharitable trust law. Thus, it appears that he likely meant tradi-
tional trust law in general when he used the term “private trust.”
246. Id. at 940–48.
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remanded the case to the commonwealth court for a 
determination on whether proceeds other than royalties from oil 
and gas leasing are subject to the public trust.247 While this 
question seems technical on its face, it has significant practical 
consequences. The bonus payments alone totaled $383 million.248
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in PEDF II, “the 
proper standard of judicial review” for this question “lies in the 
text of section 27 itself as well as the underlying principles of 
Pennsylvania trust law in effect at the time of its enactment.”249 In 
Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth 
(PEDF III),250 the commonwealth court applied private trust law to 
decide that two-thirds of the proceeds from bonus and rental 
payments belong in the constitutional public trust, while one-third 
can be spent in any way the Commonwealth sees fit.
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania began by explaining 
the meaning of bonuses and rental payments in the context of 
DCNR’s oil and gas leasing process. DCNR puts out competitive 
bids for oil and gas production on specific tracts in state forests
and other lands. While there is a standard royalty payment, 
different companies seeking to operate on the same tract submit 
different bids, and the highest bidder wins. “The bonus payment is 
money paid to DCNR after successfully obtaining a lease.”251 For 
two leases identified in the opinion as illustrative, the bonus 
payments for entering a lease were $12.3 million and $23.3 
million.252
The winning bidder enters a lease with DCNR.253 The lessee is 
required to pay annual rental fees, which tend to be $20 to $25 per 
acre of leased property, beginning the first year of the lease.254 If 
the lessee does not “commence a well” within the first five years,
the lease ends automatically.255 If oil and gas are produced, the 
lessee must make monthly royalty payments based on the quantity 
of oil and gas. The lease continues on a year-to-year basis if oil and 
gas are produced in paying quantities or if the lessee can 
demonstrate to DCNR that it “is attempting to secure or restore 
247. Id. at 936, 939.
248. Jon Hurdle, Court to Decide if Nearly $400 Million in State Oil and Gas Bonuses Fund 
Conservation, STATE IMPACT PA. (July 4, 2017, 8:38 AM), https://stateimpact.npr.org
/pennsylvania/2017/07/04/advocate-says-state-should-use-oil-gas-lease-revenue-to-fund-
conservation/. 
249. PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 930.
250. PEDF III, 214 A.3d 748 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019).
251. Id. at 772.
252. Id. at 770–71.
253. Id. at 769 (citing 71 PA. STAT. § 1340.302(a)(6)).
254. Id. at 770.
255. Id.
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the production of oil and gas.”256 The rental payments are reduced 
and possibly eliminated if oil and gas production on the lease—
and consequently the royalty payment—is high enough.257
Significantly, DCNR terminated 16 oil and gas leases between 2003 
and 2015 for lack of any oil and gas production, even though it 
received $120.5 million in bonus payments and $3.5 million in 
rental payments on those leases.258
According to the commonwealth court, the private trust law 
governing the disposition of bonus and rental payments when 
section 27 was adopted—May 1971—was section 9 of the Principal 
and Income Act of 1947, as amended.259 The Pennsylvania Act is 
based on the Uniform Principal and Income Act, which was 
promulgated in 1931 by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.260 The Uniform Act has 
been updated several times since then, including in 1997, and 
most recently in 2018.261 According to the American Bar Associa-
tion, “all but four states have adopted a statute based on the 1997 
act.”262
In a private trust context,263 the trustee “has a fiduciary 
obligation to satisfy both the interests of the trust’s income 
beneficiaries during the life of the trust, and the interests of the 
remainder beneficiaries at the trust’s termination.”264 Commonly, a 
private trust instrument provides that the trustee is to distribute 
income from the trust to certain beneficiaries while they are alive, 
and further provides that the trustee must distribute the principal 
of the trust to certain other beneficiaries who survive them. Of
course, the trust then terminates. Determination of what is income 
and what is principal “is not always self-evident.”265 The statute 
addresses this issue by setting out default rules for trustees to 
determine what is principal and what is income, and how they are 
256. Id. at 748.
257. Id. at 771.
258. Id. at 772.
259. Id. at 776; see also Principal and Income Act of 1947, 1947 Pa. Laws 1283 (amended 
1963).
260. PEDF III, 214 A.3d at 765.
261. See, e.g., FIDUCIARY INCOME AND PRINCIPLE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018).
262. A.B.A. Real Property, Trust & Estate Law Section, UFIPA: Trust Accounting for the 21st 
Century, PROB. & PROP. MAG., Nov. 2018, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/real_
property_trust_estate/publications/probate-property-magazine/2018/november-december-
2018/uniform-laws-update.
263. While the Act is directed toward trustees of a trust, it is also directed at personal 
representatives of a decedent’s estate “to the extent that the trust is a beneficiary of the es-
tate.” FIDUCIARY INCOME AND PRINCIPLE ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2018).




122 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:1
to be distributed when the trust instrument is silent on this 
question. Section 9 of the 1947 Act, which concerns natural 
resources, provides in part:
Where any part of the principal consists of property in 
lands from which may be taken timber, minerals, coal, 
stone, oil, gas or other natural resources and the trustee or 
tenant is authorized by the terms of the transaction by which the 
principal was established or by order of court to sell, lease or 
otherwise develop such natural resources or where such natural 
resources have been leased or developed prior to the 
transaction by which the principal was established, and no 
provision is made for the disposition of the net proceeds thereof 
after the payment of expenses and carrying charges on 
such property, one-third of the net proceeds, if received as rent or 
payment on a lease, or as royalties, shall be deemed income, and the 
remaining two-thirds thereof shall be deemed principal to be 
invested to produce income . . . Such proceeds if received as 
consideration for the permanent severance of such natural resources 
from the land, payable otherwise than as rents, or royalties, shall be 
deemed principal to be invested to produce income.266
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania found one case 
interpreting and applying this section of the 1947 Act.267 In re 
McLean’s Estate, a court of common pleas decision, involved a trust 
for a coal mining lease that paid a royalty of twenty-five cents per
ton of coal mined. The trust was to exist for ten years after the 
testator’s death, and income from the trust during that period was 
to be paid to designated beneficiaries (certain children and 
grandchildren). At the end of ten years, the principal was to be 
distributed to his executors. Using the 1947 Act, the common pleas 
court held that one-third of the royalties for that period were to be 
paid to the designated beneficiaries, with the balance to the 
trustees as principal.268
Section 27 is analogous to this form of trust, the commonwealth 
court reasoned. In this case, the court noted, the principal consists 
of “property in lands” from which oil and gas may be taken.
Section 27 operates as the “terms of the transaction” by authorizing 
the Commonwealth to lease public lands for oil and gas 
266. PEDF III, 214 A.3d 748, 766–67 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019) (emphasis in original) 
(quoting former section 9 of the 1947 Act, formerly 20 PA. STAT. § 3470.9).
267. Id. at 767 (citing In re McLean’s Estate, 85 Pa. D. & C. 129 (Orphans’ Ct. Wash.
Cnty. 1952)).
268. In re McLean’s Estate, 85 Pa. D. & C. 129 (Orphans’ Ct. Wash. Cnty. 1952).
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production. Quoting Justice Baer’s concurring and dissenting 
opinion in PEDF II, which in turn cited the legislative history of 
section 27, the commonwealth court explained that “[s]ection 27 
contemplates the Commonwealth’s ‘continued, but judicious, use 
of the resources,’ ” and that “the drafters ‘did not intend to freeze 
the current status of the natural resources nor to prevent the 
Commonwealth’s ability to utilize the resources.’ ”269 Moreover, the 
court reasoned, section 27 makes no provision for disposition of 
the proceeds from oil and gas production on state lands.270 Thus 
section 9 provides the governing law for this issue.
Bonus and rental payments were “received as rent or payment 
on a lease,” and not “for the permanent severance of such natural 
resources from the land.” The court reasoned:
[B]onus and rental payments are not for the severance of 
natural resources. Rather, these payments are 
consideration for the exploration for oil and gas on public 
land. More particularly, the rentals secure the lessee’s right 
to enter the property for exploratory and development 
purposes and the rents accrue based on mere passage of 
time, not the production of oil or gas. The purpose of the 
bonuses is to determine the highest bidder for the award of 
the lease. The bonuses are consideration for the execution 
of the lease, and not consideration for severance of the 
mineral.
Though bonuses and rental payments are made in 
anticipation of extraction, these payments relate directly to 
the lessee’s ability to secure the lease and the right to 
explore for oil and gas on the property. As demonstrated 
by the evidence presented, the Commonwealth is entitled 
to keep this money regardless of production, even when 
the lease is terminated.271
Therefore, the court held, one-third of those payments are to be 
deemed as income and therefore not subject to the terms of the 
constitutional public trust. On the other hand, “the remaining two-
thirds thereof shall be deemed principal,” and are therefore 
subject to the “conserve and maintain” requirement. The 1947 Act
provides “an equitable balance between the needs of present and 
269. PEDF III, 214 A.3d at 768 (citing PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 947 (Baer, J., concurring and 
dissenting)).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 773.
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future generations of Pennsylvanians,” which the court said is 
consistent with section 27.272 PEDF has appealed this decision to 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.273
III. A FOUR-STEP METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING APPLICATION OF
TRUST LAW PRINCIPLES TO NATURAL RESOURCES PUBLIC TRUSTS
As we have seen, courts have resisted claims that trust law 
principles should be applied wholesale to public trusts for natural 
resources.274 The cases described in Part I, however, suggest a 
methodology for determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether and 
how to use specific trust law principles to help interpret public 
trusts. This part sets out and applies this methodology to the issue 
decided by the commonwealth court in PEDF III—how to allocate 
bonus and rental payments from oil and gas leasing. This 
methodology has four steps.
A. Step 1: What Are the Terms and Purpose of the Public Trust?
All of the cases described in Part I recognize the paramount 
value of the purpose and terms of the particular public trust in 
question.275 The applicability or inapplicability of particular trust 
law principles depended on whether they would further or impede 
the purpose and terms of the public trust in question. Even though 
the various public trusts for natural resources differ from one 
another, and even though some of these trusts (particularly the 
school lands trusts) did not even involve natural resources 
protection, the terms and purposes of the trust are consistently 
enforced.
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made clear in PEDF II, the 
terms and purpose of section 27 provide the frame for any 
discussion about the applicability of the constitutional public trust 
272. Id. at 774.
273. Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, (No. 64 MAP 2019 (Pa. filed Aug. 12, 
2019)).
274. See supra notes 154–60 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Price v. Hawaii, 921 F.2d 
950, 953 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting claim that school trust lands granted by federal govern-
ment to Hawai’i “are, as a matter of federal law, subject to the strictures imposed upon pri-
vate trustees and that they must manage the granted lands in accordance with private trust 
principles”). The court explained that applying “all provisions of the common law of trusts 
would manacle the State as it attempted to deal with the vast quantity of land conveyed to it”
in public trust.” Id. at 955.
275. This is also the starting point for analysis in traditional trust cases. See, e.g., Nebraska 
v. Rural Electrification Admin., 23 F.3d 1336 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that Platte River 
Whooping Crane Maintenance Trust had not violated the terms of the trust).
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to public natural resources. Thus, the Commonwealth is obliged to 
“conserve and maintain” public natural resources for the benefit of
present and future generations. The PEDF II court held that 
royalties from oil and gas leasing should be used to conserve and 
maintain public natural resources and not for other purposes.
While the PEDF II court obviously did not decide how bonus and 
rental payments from oil and gas leases could be expended, it 
emphasized the importance of the text and purposes of section 27
in deciding that question.
The primacy of the law recognizing the public trust is 
particularly compelling when it is contained in a constitution. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in PEDF II made that point clear by 
holding that several legislative enactments violated section 27. In 
PEDF III, the commonwealth court seems to suggest that section 27 
should be interpreted in light of legislative enactments authorizing 
oil and gas leasing on state lands. But if so, that suggestion is not 
correct.276 Rather, the oil and gas leasing legislation should be 
interpreted and applied in light of section 27. The commonwealth 
court concluded that, because the legislative history of section 27 
contemplates oil and gas leasing on state forest land, section 27 
authorizes oil and gas leasing.277 Actually, the legislative history is 
silent on the leasing of state lands for nonrenewable resources like 
oil and gas. Instead, it addresses the harvesting of renewable 
276. It is true that limited leasing of state forest and park lands was occurring when 
article I, section 27 was adopted. Since at least 1955, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR) and its predecessor agencies have leased state 
forests for oil and gas drilling. The Oil and Gas Lease Fund Act of 1955 set out DCNR’s
responsibilities for administering that program, and assigned all rents and royalties received 
from leasing to DCNR, to be used for “conservation, recreation, dams, or flood control.” 71 
PA. STAT. §§ 1331–33 (West 1955), repealed by 2017 Pa. Laws 725 §20(2)(i). The wells under 
this program, mostly small in size and impact, generated a modest amount of money that 
DCNR used to offset the environmental impacts of the program and for other conservation 
purposes. See Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, No. 228 M.D. 2012, 2013 WL 
3942086, at *3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 22, 2013). This case is a predecessor to PEDF I and its 
progeny.
The level of activity and the revenues generated were relatively small, and the moneys 
were expended on conservation and related purposes. This activity is a far cry from the vastly 
greater scale of oil and gas leasing of forest and park land and moneys received that the 
shale gas revolution created. Leasing revenues grew from several million dollars per year to 
several hundred million dollars per year. See John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a 
Constitutional Public Trust, 45 ENV’T L. 463, 488 (2015) (summarizing data).
The relatively small scale and impact of oil and gas leasing on state lands in 1971, when 
section 27 was adopted, simply do not compare with the scale and impact of oil and gas leas-
ing at present. No one in 1971 could have expected that hydraulic fracturing of Marcellus 
Shale—a rock layer that previously had little if any commercial value—could be used to ex-
ploit gas commercially—much less the future scale of production on state forest and park 
land. The first use of hydraulic fracturing for gas production did not occur in Pennsylvania 
until 2004. RUSSELL GOLD, THE BOOM: HOW FRACKING IGNITED THE AMERICAN ENERGY 
REVOLUTION AND CHANGED THE WORLD 227–28 (2014).
277. PEDF III, 214 A.3d at 768.
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resources like timber and game. At the request of Dr. Maurice 
Goddard, who was then Secretary of the Department of Forests and 
Waters, the legislature substituted “conserve” for “preserve” in the 
amendment’s second sentence.278 While it is true that DCNR has 
statutory authorization to lease state land for oil and gas 
development,279 there is no comparable authorization in section 
27. The “governing instrument”—section 27—says only that these 
resources must be conserved and maintained for the benefit of 
present and future generations. That is the “expressed intention”
of the settlor. Oil and gas drilling on state forest land may be 
consistent with section 27, but so would a moratorium on oil and 
gas drilling on state forest land. Indeed, there have been several 
moratoria on further leasing of state lands for oil and gas in recent 
years.280 In either case, under trust law, the question to be asked is 
whether the action in question is consistent with the text and 
purpose of section 27.
B. Step 2: Do the Terms and Purpose of the 
Public Trust Answer the Question?
When courts use trust law to help interpret public trusts law and 
construe the text of the governing law, they do so only when the 
public trust text does not answer the question being asked. These 
courts interpreted the meaning of public trusts for natural 
resources in light of the duty to monitor (Ching v. Case281), the duty 
of prudence (Columbia Land Development, LLC v. Secretary of State282), 
and the duty of loyalty (Slocum v. Borough of Belmar283). They have 
also used trust law to decide how the proceeds from oil and gas 
leasing on public trust lands can be expended (City of Long Beach v. 
Morse284). In each of these cases, the court did so because the text 
278. See ROBERT BROUGHTON, ANALYSIS OF HB 958, THE PROPOSED PENNSYLVANIA 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, LEGIS. J.–HOUSE, April 14, 1970, at 2273, reprinted 
in Dernbach & Sonnenberg, supra note 178, at 218–50. Broughton’s article also was 
published as Robert Broughton, The Proposed Pennsylvania Declaration of Environmental Rights, 
Analysis of HB 958, 41 PA. BAR ASS’N Q. 421 (1970). Dr. Goddard worried that “preserve”
might prohibit his department from authorizing “trees to be cut on Commonwealth land”
or prohibit the game commission from licensing hunters to “harvest game.” Id. at 424.
279. See Conservation and Natural Resources Act § 302(a)(6), 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 
1340.302(a)(6) (2012).
280. See, e.g., Pa. Exec. Order No. 2010-05 (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.pedf.org/uploads
/1/9/0/7/19078501/executive_order_2010-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/XC8Q-6E28]; Pa. 
Exec. Order No. 2015-03 (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.oa.pa.gov/Policies/eo/Documents
/2015_03.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS6R-HZ4M].
281. Ching v. Case, 449 P.3d 1146 (Haw. 2019).
282. Columbia Land Dev., LLC v. Sec’y of State, 868 So. 2d 1006 (Miss. 2004).
283. Slocum v. Borough of Belmar, 569 A.2d 312 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989).
284. City of Long Beach v. Morse, 188 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1947).
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of the public trust did not fully address the legal claims being 
made. As a result, any argument for the use of trust law principles 
in construing a public trust must begin with a demonstration that 
the public trust text does not answer the question.
On the question of how rental and bonus payments can be 
expended, there is a strong, but perhaps not conclusive, argument 
that section 27, as interpreted in PEDF II, answers the question. In 
PEDF II, the Commonwealth argued that it had discretion to 
decide how moneys received from the sale of oil and gas resources 
would be spent because section 27 was silent on the matter.285 By 
contrast, the Commonwealth reasoned, two other constitutionally 
established funds expressly state how the money in those funds is 
to be spent.286 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed:
[T]he creation of a trust in the Environmental Rights 
Amendment obviates the need for additional language 
indicating that funds should be dedicated for a specific 
purpose. Section 27 itself establishes that the purpose of 
the trust is to ‘‘conserve and maintain’’ the public natural 
resources and basic trust principles require that the 
proceeds from their sale remain part of the corpus.287
In PEDF III, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court relied on 
the same argument for bonus and rental payments that the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court rejected for royalties in PEDF II:
Although Section 27 expressed the intent to conserve and 
maintain the corpus – public natural resources – for the 
benefit of all the people, it made no provision for the 
disposition of the net proceeds obtained from the use 
thereof. In other words, it did not specify the method for 
allocating receipts. Though Section 27’s intent was clear, 
the directions for administration of the trust were not 
expressly delineated. Consequently, Section 9 of the 1947 
Act governs the ascertainment of income and principal and 
285. PEDF II, 161 A.3d 911, 933–34 (Pa. 2017).
286. Id. at 934 n.26; see also, e.g., PA. CONST. art VIII, § 15 (authorizing the 
Commonwealth “to create debt and to issue bonds in the amount of $70,000,000 for the 
acquisition of land for State parks, reservoirs and other conservation and recreation and 
historical preservation purposes”); id. § 16 (authorizing the Commonwealth to create debt 
and issue bonds for $500 million for, among other things, “the conservation and 
reclamation of land and water resources of the Commonwealth, including the elimination 
of acid mine drainage, sewage, and other pollution from the streams of the 
Commonwealth”).
287. PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 933 n.26 (distinguishing the two funds because they do not 
establish trusts).
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the apportionment of proceeds between income and 
principal.288
Because section 27 and trust law require royalty payments to be 
used to conserve and maintain public natural resources, however,
it would seem to follow that section 27 requires the same of bonus 
and rental payments, unless the relevant trust law for bonus and 
rental payments is different from the relevant trust law for 
royalties. (As explained below, it is not.) This is also consistent with 
the California Supreme Court’s holding in City of Long Beach that, 
because the tidelands are held in trust, revenues (not just royalties) 
from the sale or lease of oil and gas rights must also be held in 
trust.289 While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in PEDF II left open 
the issue of how bonus and rental payments are to be expended, its 
reasoning at least points in the direction of a limitation to the same 
public trust purposes.
C. Step 3: If the Terms and Purpose of the Public Trust Do Not Answer the 
Question, What Underlying Principles of Trust Law Can Help Provide 
an Answer?
Not surprisingly, the interpreting principles in these cases 
appear to be supplied primarily by the litigants themselves or by 
prior judicial decisions. In some cases, as Part I indicates, parties 
succeed in claiming that an interpretive principle should be 
applied, and in other cases, they do not. It is also likely that some 
courts may have conducted their own research.
However these principles come before a court, the threshold 
question is what pool of trust principles they should be drawn 
from. The other question is what particular trust principles from 
this pool are most relevant.
1.  Meaning of “Underlying Principles”
As a general matter, the pool of trust law principles in any state 
should include general trust law principles, charitable trust law 
principles, and private trust law principles, unless prior judicial de-
cisions limit the scope of the inquiry in some way. Here, the PEDF 
288. PEDF III, 214 A.3d 748, 768 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019).
289. City of Long Beach, 188 P.2d at 20 (“Once it is made clear that the lands are held in 
trust, it necessarily follows that their proceeds, whether by sale or lease, are likewise subject 
to the trust.”) (quoting Provident Land Corp. v. Zumwalt, 85 P.2d 116, 120 (Cal. 1938)).
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II court focused on Pennsylvania trust law in general as an inter-
pretative tool: “[W]e hold that the Commonwealth, as trustee, 
must manage [public natural resources] according to the plain 
language of section 27, which imposes fiduciary duties consistent with 
Pennsylvania trust law.”290 In articulating the standard of review, the 
court stated that section 27 is to be interpreted and applied in 
accordance with both its text and “underlying principles of 
Pennsylvania trust law in effect at the time of its enactment.”291 Fi-
nally, for the remand, it directed the commonwealth court, “in the 
first instance and in strict accordance and fidelity to Pennsylvania 
trust principles, to determine whether [bonus and rental payments] 
belong in the corpus of the section 27 trust.”292 These broad 
references to trust law would seem to embrace not only general 
trust law principles but also principles based on any type of trust 
Pennsylvania trust law recognizes, including both charitable and 
private trusts.293 In addition, the court made clear that the general 
trustee duties of loyalty, impartiality, and prudence apply to the 
section 27 public trust.294 These principles, which apply to both pri-
vate and charitable trusts, would thus be in play in the remand.
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania believed, based on a 
reference to “private trust principles” in an explanatory footnote, 
that it was limited to private trust principles.295 In that footnote, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court said:
[T]he public trust doctrine provides a framework for states
to draft their own public trust provisions, which (like many 
trust instruments) will ultimately be interpreted by the state 
courts. In Pennsylvania, established private trust principles 
provide this Court with the necessary tools to properly 
interpret the trust created by Section 27.296
290. PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 916 (emphasis added).
291. Id. at 930.
292. Id. at 935–36 (emphasis added).
293. The distinction between private and charitable trust law is reflected in 
Pennsylvania’s Uniform Trust Act. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7702 (2014) (“This chapter 
applies to express trusts, charitable and noncharitable, and trusts created pursuant to a 
statute, judgment or decree that requires the trust to be administered in the manner of an 
express trust.”).
294. PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 932–33 (citations omitted).
295. PEDF III, 214 A.3d 748, 755 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019) (citing PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 933 
n.26).
296. PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 934 n.26. Significantly, the state supreme court was apparently 
responding to Justice Baer’s concurring and dissenting opinion in this footnote. Justice Baer 
repeatedly referred to trust law as private trust law. See supra note 245 and accompanying 
text. Except in this footnote, the majority did not refer to private trust law. Nor is there any 
reference to private trust law in any of the Robinson Township opinions. Robinson Township, as 
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While the footnote creates some ambiguity about the scope of 
trust principles that may be considered, use of “private trust” in 
this context is best understood as contrasting ordinary or 
traditional trust principles (i.e., the body of law governing trusts 
generally) with public trust principles. By this reading, private trust 
law is simply trust law that is not public trust law. Given the state 
supreme court’s three other references to trust law in general in 
the text of its opinion—and its use of these broad references to 
state the holding, standard of review, and remand directions to the 
commonwealth court—this understanding makes sense. After all, if 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had intended to limit the range 
of trust principles to “private trust principles,” it would surely have 
said so in these key statements. When it analyzed which trust 
principles to apply to determine whether royalties from oil and gas 
leasing are part of the public trust corpus, it made no distinction 
between private trust law principles and other trust law principles.
In fact, it cited both private trust law and charitable trust law.297 Nor 
is it likely that the state supreme court would have used an explan-
atory footnote to limit the meaning of its holding, standard of re-
view, and remand instructions.  This is particularly true when this 
footnote contains the only reference to “private trust” in the major-
ity opinion. Moreover, given the care that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in PEDF II took in explaining how section 27 is to 
be applied, the omission of any explanation for limiting the scope 
of this review to private trust law is telling. There is no explanation 
of different types of trust law, or why private trust law principles are 
to be preferred to those for charitable trusts, if at all. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court could not have intended the remand to be 
limited to private trust law.
In interpreting and applying section 27, moreover, courts 
should have the ability to consider trust law principles from any 
relevant type of trust. As noted earlier, and further explained 
below, charitable trusts in some ways have more in common with
public trusts for natural resources than private trusts. After all, 
charitable trusts involve substantial social or public benefits, and 
section 27 is intended to conserve and maintain public natural 
resources for the benefit of the public, including future 
generations. More basically, perhaps, the Commonwealth under 
section 27 is supposed to act as a trustee, not a proprietor. There 
previously explained, provides the foundation for the PEDF II majority opinion. See supra
text accompanying note 186.
297. PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 932–36; see also supra note 211 (summarizing key charitable and 
private trust law cases cited therein).
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does not appear to be any reasonable basis for limiting these trust 
law principles to those for private trusts.
It may also be appropriate for courts to consider trust principles 
that developed after 1971. In PEDF II, the state supreme court 
created a time limit for these “underlying principles of 
Pennsylvania trust law”; they must be “in effect at the time of 
[Section 27’s] enactment.”298 Presumably, it did so to preserve the 
original intent of the amendment. But trust law in general is not 
written that way. The Pennsylvania Uniform Trust Act of 2006, with 
limited exceptions, applies to “all trusts created before, on, or 
after” its effective date.299
Moreover, section 27 was specifically written to allow for its 
evolution over time, which suggests that the trust law principles to 
be considered in interpreting it should not be limited to trust law 
in effect in 1971. When the amendment was debated in the 
legislature, for example, it originally contained a list of protected 
resources: “air, waters, fish, wildlife, and the public lands and 
property of the Commonwealth.”300 There was concern that listing 
the specific resources subject to the public trust might forever limit 
the public trust corpus to those resources.301 As a result, the list was 
removed.302 While there was no evident objection to the listed 
subjects, at least insofar as they constitute public natural resources, 
the drafters intended to authorize the continuing development of 
public trust law, including its application to public resources not 
previously recognized as such. The amendment’s supporters 
observed that neither public trust resources nor private property 
are legally fixed.303 Previously recognized forms of private property 
have disappeared, and future public property rights, perhaps 
298. PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 930. None of the cases described in Part I include any 
comparable temporal limitation on the choice of trust principles to be employed to 
supplement the meaning of a public trust.
299. 2006 Pa. Laws No. 98 § 16(3). In addition, the current version of the Principal and
Income Act, adopted in 2002, states that it is applicable to a trust existing on or after the 
effective date of the Act. 2002 Pa. Laws No. 50 § 14(a).
300. See H.B. 958, 153d Leg., 2nd Sess. (Pa. 1969) (Printer’s No. 1105); BROUGHTON,
supra note 278, at 424; COMMONWEALTH OF PA. LEGIS. J., 154 Gen Assemb., Sess. of 1970, at
2272 (1970).
301. BROUGHTON, supra note 278, at 425–26 (“The introducing word, ‘including,’ would 
not ordinarily be so interpreted, but a list always presents some danger that a court may
sometime use the list to limit, rather than expand, a basic concept.”).
302. Compare H.B. 958, 153d Leg., 2nd Sess. (Pa. 1969) (Printer’s No. 2860), with H.B. 
958 153d Leg., 2d Sess. (Pa. 1969) (Printer’s No. 1105) (changing the proposed amended 
language to section 27 by removing the listed resources from the second sentence, among 
other revisions).
303. See, e.g., BROUGHTON, supra note 278, at 425–26.
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relating to ecological diversity, might someday be recognized.304
The final language neither requires nor prohibits further changes 
in the boundary between public natural resources and private 
property rights.305 Similarly, it seems appropriate to allow for the 
development of future trust law principles.
2.  Principles to Consider
After identifying the relevant sources of trust law, courts should 
then determine what specific trust law principles should be consid-
ered. The question in this step is not whether any particular prin-
ciple actually applies to the particular public trust in question. The 
question, rather, is whether there is a legally plausible argument 
that a particular principle could apply.
As the distinction between private trusts and perpetual 
charitable trusts makes clear, more than one trust principle may be 
available to help interpret the meaning in a public trust provision.
In addition, more than one general trust law principle may be 
plausibly applicable. When the provision does not answer the 
question being asked, the parties and the court should identify all 
relevant trust law principles, so that there can be sufficient 
argument and informed judicial decision about which principles
will most further the terms and purpose of the public trust (estab-
lished in Step 1 of the analysis).
Assuming for the sake of argument that section 27 does not 
supply an answer to the question of how bonus and rental
payments should be expended, does the law of private trusts 
provide the only possible trust principle that can be applied here? 
The answer is no. Several general trust law principles are potential-
ly applicable. In addition, the law of charitable trusts provides 
another relevant trust law principle.
To begin with, the principle that the commonwealth court ap-
plied is not just a private law principle (although it applied the 
principle in a private law context), and this principle does not al-
low money from the trust to be expended for non-trust purposes.
So its consideration appears questionable unless one believes, as 
the commonwealth court did, that it could look only at private law 
principles. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania treated the 
304. See id. at 425 (“At one time, for example, an advowson, a right to appoint a 
clerk at a church, was a real property right, inheritable by heirs, and the subject of 
real property actions. Today, an advowson is strictly an historical curiosity.”).
305. See id. at 426. Restrictions on the use of public natural resources do, of course, 
indirectly affect uses of private property.
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Principal and Income Act of 1947 as a form of private trust law.
Although this conclusion is incorrect, it is not hard to see why the 
Commonwealth Court reached it. As the commonwealth court 
explained, the 1947 Act was based on the 1931 Uniform Principal 
and Income Act, which was intended to ascertain which moneys 
from income-producing trusts should be treated as income and 
which should be treated as principal. It was also intended to allo-
cate those moneys between those with a life estate in the trust and 
those who hold the remainder interest.306
This kind of private trust is commonplace. As a prominent trust 
treatise explains: 
Nearly all trustees act for two classes of beneficiaries, 
namely, income beneficiaries who are to receive the net 
income from the trust property for a period of years or 
lives, and remainder beneficiaries who at the termination 
of the income administration are given the capital or 
principal of the trust.307
Put differently, these trusts are income-producing trusts. If such 
trusts were created before January 1, 2007, the effective date for 
the Pennsylvania legislature’s abolition of the rule against 
perpetuities, they were governed by that rule, and are thus are also 
inherently limited in duration.308
It is important to emphasize, however, that section 9 of the 
Principal and Income Act of 1947 provides a rule of trust law, not 
just private trust law, even though the commonwealth court treated 
it as a private trust law rule. Section 9 provides for the allocation of 
receipts from natural resources between income and principal to 
be disposed of when the trust instrument is silent regarding 
allocation. This allocation is clearly suitable for private trusts where 
the trust instrument is silent on allocation. In the absence of the
1947 Act, the income beneficiary would seek allocation of receipts 
to income, while the principal beneficiary would seek allocation of 
receipts to principal. But however principal and income are allo-
cated, the allocation cannot be inconsistent with the terms and 
306. PEDF III, 214 A.3d 748, 765–66 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019).
307. BOGERT, TRUSTS, supra note 92, § 111.
308. In re Stephan’s Estate, 195 A. 653 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1937) (holding that noncharitable 
trust cannot be perpetual because it would violate rule against perpetuities). In 2006, the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly abolished the rule against perpetuities for trusts created 
after December 31, 2006. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6107.1 (2019). That means that private 
or noncharitable trusts could now be perpetual. If courts are limited to consideration of 
trust principles that existed in 1971 when section 27 was adopted, then for section 27 pur-
poses courts must continue to understand the trusts covered under section 9 of the 
Principal and Income Act as limited in duration.
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purpose of the trust. Section 9 can fill in missing terms of a private 
trust instrument, but it cannot change the terms of the instrument.
Similarly, in the charitable trust context, the 1947 Act is suitable 
for determining the allocation of receipts between principal and 
income where the trust instrument is silent on allocation. Without 
the 1947 Act, the charity entitled to receive income would seek 
allocation of receipts to income while the Pennsylvania Attorney 
General would seek a portion of receipts to be allocated to 
principal. Even in the case of a charitable trust, the income derived 
from the corpus must be applied for the same charitable purpose.
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania limited its inquiry to 
private trust law principles and did not also consider general prin-
ciples of trust law. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made clear 
in PEDF II, however, section 27 must be interpreted and applied in 
light of certain general trust law duties. These include the duties of 
loyalty, prudence, and impartiality.309
Each of these is worth considering in this context. The trustee’s
duty of prudence, which means that the trustee must manage the 
trust corpus with “such care and skill as a man of ordinary 
prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property,”310 is 
relevant because a diversion of funds from the section 27 trust 
could deprive the state of needed funds to conserve and maintain 
public natural resources. Loyalty, managing the trust “so as to 
accomplish the trust’s purposes for the benefit of the trust’s
beneficiaries,”311 is also relevant because the commonwealth court 
allows the state to use trust money for non-trust purposes. Finally, 
the trustee’s duty of impartiality, which requires the trustee to 
manage the trust “so as to give all of the beneficiaries due regard 
for their respective interests in light of the purposes of the trust,”312
is relevant. The commonwealth court’s decision appears to allow 
the present generation to receive a cash benefit from the depletion 
of nonrenewable resources that, according to section 27, are for 
the benefit of both present and future generations. If so, that 
could violate the duty of impartiality.
The duty of charitable trustees, particularly for perpetual chari-
table trusts, provides another principle that should be considered.
There are a variety of types of partially charitable trusts, many of 
which are finite in duration.313 In a charitable lead trust, a “certain 
309. PEDF II, 161 A.3d 911, 932–33 (Pa. 2017) (citations omitted).
310. Id. (citations omitted).
311. Id. (citations omitted).
312. Id. at 933 (citations omitted).
313. STEINBACHER & WOLFE, supra note 163, § 4.9 (explaining charitable lead trusts and 
charitable remainder trusts as the two basic types of charitable trusts for charitable planning 
purposes).
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amount is paid to the charity for a period of years and then the 
remainder interest is paid to the non-charitable beneficiaries.”314 In 
a charitable remainder trust, “the trust document provides that 
payments are made to a non-charitable beneficiary first and then 
the remainder is paid to a charitable beneficiary.”315 Both types of 
trust are limited in duration. But some trusts are purely charitable,
and many have no termination date. These perpetual charitable 
trusts have long been recognized in Pennsylvania.316 Typically, the 
settlor creates the trust to provide perpetual funding for a 
specified charitable purpose, such as an educational institution, 
scholarships at that institution, or the like.317
As a general principle, it is impermissible to use charitable trust 
property, whether income or principal, for purposes other than 
those specified in the trust instrument.318 Deviation from this 
principle is permitted only under limited circumstances. Perhaps 
the most well-known allowable deviation is provided by the cy pres
doctrine, which applies only to charitable trusts,319 and which 
comes into play “if a particular charitable purpose becomes 
unlawful, impracticable or wasteful.”320 When that occurs, “the 
court shall apply cy pres to fulfill as nearly as possible the settlor’s
charitable intention, whether it be general or specific.”321 Other 
allowable exceptions to the terms of charitable trusts also require 




316. See, e.g., In re McKee’s Estate, 108 A.2d 214, 232 (Pa. 1954) (citing City of 
Philadelphia v. Girard’s Heirs, 45 Pa. 9 (Pa. 1863)).
317. See, e.g., In re Milton Hershey School, 911 A.2d 1258 (Pa. 2006); In re Wright’s
Estate, 131 A. 188 (Pa. 1925).
318. See Bolton v. Stillwagon, 190 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1963) (holding that it was impermissible 
for the trustee of a charitable trust for the perpetual care of a cemetery to expend trust 
funds for other purposes), cited with approval in PEDF II, 161 A.3d 911, 935 (Pa. 2017). This 
principle appears to derive from the trustee’s “duty to administer the trust, diligently and in 
good faith, in accordance with the terms of the trust and applicable law.” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76(1) (AM. L. INST. 2007). The trustee’s duties include “applying or 
distributing trust income and principal during the administration of the trust” Id. § 
76(2)(d). If the trust provides for distribution for charitable purposes, it must be distributed 
for those purposes. Id. cmt. f.
319. BOGERT, TRUSTS, supra note 92, § 147; In re Dreisbach’s Estate, 121 A.2d 74, 76 (Pa. 
1956).
320. 20 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 7740.3(a) (2014).
321. Id. § 7740.3(a)(3) (2014); see also In re Kay’s Estate, 317 A.2d 193, 198 (Pa. 1974) 
(“The application of the doctrine of cy pres should effectuate the intent of the testator as 
nearly as humanly possible.”).
322. See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7735(b) (authorizing court to “select one or 
more charitable purposes or beneficiaries” if “the provisions of a charitable trust instrument 
do not indicate or authorize the trustee to select a particular charitable purpose or 
beneficiary,” but requiring that the court’s “selection must be consistent with the settlor’s
intention to the extent it can be ascertained”); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7740.3(d) 
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The section 27 public trust is similar to a perpetual charitable 
trust because it involves a public purpose—conservation and 
maintenance of public natural resources. Because it has no 
termination clause or express means of termination, it is perpetual.
And the class of beneficiaries—present and future generations—is 
large and unnamed. In both, the trustee has an obligation to 
protect and maintain the trust corpus for public benefit 
indefinitely. So long as the purposes of the constitutional public 
trust are being achieved, the extent to which each member of the 
class benefits from the public trust does not matter. The trust 
principle limiting the use of moneys contained in a perpetual 
charitable trust to the purpose stated in the trust is thus another
candidate for consideration to help interpret the meaning of the 
section 27 public trust.
D. Step 4: Which Principles Would Most Fully Effectuate the Terms and 
Purpose of the Public Trust?
The fourth and final stage in the decision-making process is to 
determine whether the proffered principles would further or 
undermine the terms and purpose of the public trust. As discussed 
in Part I, judicial decisions on this issue turn on the terms and 
purpose of the particular law recognizing the public trust in 
question. Of course, a court only needs to get to this stage if it 
believes that the law recognizing the public trust—in Pennsylvania, 
section 27—needs interpretative clarification. Given the terms of 
section 27, the general duties of trustees and the charitable trust 
principle are better than section 9 at furthering the purpose of the 
section 27 public trust.
1. General Duties of Trustees
The trustee duties of loyalty, prudence, and impartiality—
general trust duties under section 27 that the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court recognized in PEDF II—all support using the bonus 
(authorizing administrative termination of small charitable trusts but requiring that the trust 
corpus be handled so as to “fulfill as nearly as possible the settlor’s intention”); 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 7740.3(e) (authorizing judicial termination of charitable trusts under limited 
circumstances but requiring that trust corpus be distributed “to fulfill as nearly as possible 
the settlor’s intentions other than any intent to continue the trust”). Another limited 
exception also exists. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7740.3(c) (authorizing judicial modification 
of administrative provisions of charitable trust “to the extent necessary to preserve the 
trust”).
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and rental income from oil and gas leasing only for the purposes 
specified in section 27. In other words, these principles support 
adherence to the terms of the trust.
A loyal trustee administers the trust entirely for the beneficiaries 
and for trust purposes, and not for others or other purposes. This 
principle also does not encourage the Commonwealth to act as a 
proprietor, using the public trust corpus to balance the budget or 
fund non-trust activities.323 This result is consistent with the New 
Jersey Superior Court’s decision in Slocum v. Borough of Belmar that 
Belmar violated its duty of loyalty under the state’s public trust law 
by charging and using beach admission fees to pay for municipal 
expenses.324 Thus, bonus and rental receipts are to be used for the 
conservation and maintenance of public natural resources.325 Use 
of section 9 as a private trust principle could help encourage the 
Commonwealth to lease state forest and park lands for oil and gas 
drilling to help balance the budget. Although much less money 
would be received for general fund purposes than from royalties—
one-third of the income and bonus payments—it would still create 
some incentive for leasing to balance the budget.
Section 9, as understood by the commonwealth court, also 
undermines the trustee’s duty of prudence. As the Mississippi Su-
preme Court explained in Columbia Land Development, LLC v. 
323. PEDF II, 161 A.3d 911, 932 (Pa. 2017); see also DAVID C. SLADE, R. KERRY KEHOE &
JANE K. STAHL, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK: THE APPLICATION OF THE 
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF LANDS, WATERS, AND LIVING RESOURCES 
OF THE COASTAL STATES 326 (1997) (“If the State exercises its rights and authorities for the 
particular benefit of the State itself (e.g., selling public trust lands simply to raise revenues 
or balance its budget) or for the benefit of any one individual, or small group of individuals, 
that act could be challenged in most State courts as a violation of the State’s duty of loyalty 
to the beneficiaries as a whole.”).
324. Slocum v. Borough of Belmar, 569 A.2d 312 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989).
325. The specific purpose for which these funds can be expended, consistent with the 
duty to conserve and maintain public natural resources, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
But it is worth noting that some states have created special trust funds for money from oil 
and gas leasing, which stipulate in greater detail the uses to which those funds may be put. 
See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 35 (creating Michigan Natural Resources Trust Fund). The 
fund generally consists of “all bonuses, rentals, delayed rentals, and royalties collected or 
reserved by the state under provisions of leases for the extraction of nonrenewable resources 
from state owned lands.” Id. Up to 75 percent of the total amounts made available for 
expenditure each year are to be “expended for acquisition of land and rights in land” and 
up to 25 percent is to “be expended for development of public recreation facilities.” Id. The 
fund is capped at $500 million in accumulated principal. Id. “The fund, bankrolled by 
royalties paid on the sale and lease of state-owned oil, gas and mineral rights, has quietly 
generated more than a billion dollars to buy land or land rights, and to develop quality 
outdoor recreational facilities and opportunities in Michigan.” See Michigan Natural 
Resources Trust Fund Celebrates 40th Anniversary, MICHIGAN.GOV (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,4570,7-350-79137_79770_79873_80003-381073—,00.html
[https://perma.cc/WDY4-HD7Z]. For a proposal to establish a comparable trust fund in 
Pennsylvania, see KATE KONSCHNIK & GENEVIEVE PARSHALLE, HARVARD L. SCH. ENV’T L.
PROGRAM, PUBLIC CONSERVATION TRUST FUND DESIGN OPTIONS: ENDOWING PUBLIC LANDS 
CONSERVATION IN PENNSYLVANIA WITH SHALE GAS REVENUES (2013).
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Secretary of State, the trustee’s duty of prudence means that it must 
administer the public trust in a manner that ensures that the trust 
purposes are achieved.326 Here, the use of proceeds from bonus 
and rental payments for trust purposes is more likely to ensure that 
enough money is available to conserve and maintain public natural 
resources. Oil and gas exploration and production cause a variety 
of environmental impacts on state forest and park land.327
Including all of the rental and bonus payments in the trust corpus 
will enhance the likelihood that enough money will be available to 
cover these costs. There is nothing in the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court’s opinion supporting the conclusion that 
diversion of one-third of the rental and bonus receipts to the 
general fund will allow the Commonwealth to conserve and 
maintain all of the public natural resources for which it has a 
public trust responsibility. Diversion of this money reduces the 
likelihood that the Commonwealth will have sufficient funds to 
conserve and maintain these resources. 328
Finally, section 9 as understood by the commonwealth court also 
undermines the duty of impartiality toward beneficiaries. Section 
27’s trust obligations are specifically for the benefit of both present 
and future generations. The state cannot put its thumb on the 
scale in favor of the present generation over future generations, 
particularly because that is precisely how natural resources histori-
cally have been degraded. The commonwealth court’s decision al-
lows the state to use a fraction of bonus and rental payments from 
oil and gas leasing to provide cash for the present generation in re-
turn for the permanent extraction of nonrenewable public natural 
resources that are also intended to benefit future generations. It is 
true, as the commonwealth court explained, that sites where no gas 
production occurs bring in much of the bonus and rental money 
326. See Columbia Land Dev., LLC v. Sec’y of State, 868 So. 2d 1006, 1015–16 (Miss. 
2004) (holding that the Secretary of State’s duty of prudence in managing and protecting 
tidelands for public trust purposes authorized Secretary of State to deny lease for use of 
those tidelands even though three other agencies had approved the lease project).
327. See, e.g., Natural Gas Management, PA. DEP’T CONSERVATION & NAT. RES., https://
www.dcnr.pa.gov/Conservation/ForestsAndTrees/NaturalGasDrillingImpact/Pages
/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/G3KF-6TAY].
328. Cf. Snyder Brothers, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 198 A.3d 1056 (Pa. 2018), which 
involved the meaning of a state statute imposing an “impact fee” on wells that produced 
more than 90,000 cubic of gas in “any” month. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized 
“the evident intent of the legislature that the impact fee provide an adequate and stable 
source of revenue for counties and municipalities to offset the adverse effects of 
unconventional gas well production. . . .” Id. at 1075. The court decided that “any” month 
meant that this production level needed to occur in only one month of the calendar year, 
not every month. Id. at 1076. Among other things, the court explained, this “will result in 
more producers paying the impact fee – exactly what the General Assembly intended,” a
construction “which best effectuates” the purpose of the Act. Id.
FALL 2020] Defining Public Trust Duties 139
under these leases. But sites where gas production does occur also 
generate bonus and rental money. In addition, as explained more 
fully below, the entire leasing process, including the generation of 
bonus and rental money, is directed toward gas extraction.
These three general trust principles provide ample grounds for 
requiring that expenditure of bonus and rental payments be lim-
ited to the purposes of the section 27 public trust. An additional 
principle supporting this result is provided by the law of charitable 
trusts.
2. Perpetual Charitable Trust Principle
In the cases in Section I.B.1 where courts expressly applied 
principles of trust law to public trusts for natural resources, the 
courts explained how these trust law principles would further the 
public trust. The perpetual charitable trust principle limiting the 
use of moneys received from the sale or lease of the trust corpus to 
trust purposes would further the purposes of section 27. In fact, 
this is the same result obtained by simply following the text of 
section 27. It is also consistent with the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s analysis in PEDF II, which focused on the Commonwealth’s
constitutional duty to “conserve and maintain” public natural 
resources as the guiding principle in determining how to allocate 
royalty money from oil and gas leasing. It follows that the use of 
this principle would not undermine the constitutional public trust.
Because moneys received from the perpetual charitable trust 
corpus, or otherwise received by the trustee, are devoted to stated 
charitable trust purposes, these trusts benefit both present and 
future generations in a manner that is similar to section 27—
equally and without distinction. That is, perpetual charitable trusts 
and the section 27 public trust benefit those who are now living 
and those who are yet to be born, and do not distribute benefits 
differently to each. In perpetual charitable trusts, present and 
future generations may both receive benefits, but they are not 
treated as separate. While the present generation represents a 
large class of discrete people, the identity of these people changes 
over time as people die and others are born. When people are 
born, they move from being part of future generations to being 
part of the present generation. When people die, they are no 
longer part of the present generation. For both section 27 and 
perpetual charitable trusts, the present generation’s membership is 
fluid and constantly changing, and the identity of members of 
future generations is unknown. While all living and future 
members of these classes may benefit from each of these trusts, 
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these trusts do not specifically direct trust benefits to named 
individuals or classes of individuals. For both charitable trusts and 
the section 27 trust, a defining characteristic is that the public 
benefits, not specified individuals.
This perpetual charitable trust principle would not impede or 
undermine the section 27 public trust. It keeps money from bonus 
and rental payments in the public trust, where it can be used to 
conserve and maintain public natural resources, whether it is ac-
counted for as income or principal. This principle also would en-
courage the Commonwealth to act as a trustee and not as a propri-
etor. This perpetual charitable trust law principle is thus a good fit 
for section 27, and, like the general trust principles, would keep all 
of the moneys received from oil and gas leasing in the public trust.
3.  Private Trust Principle
In the cases in Section I.B.2 where courts refused to apply trust 
principles to help interpret public trusts, the courts explained how 
these principles would undermine or weaken the public trust for 
natural resources. A continuing theme in many of these cases is 
that the proffered private trust law principles would weaken 
constitutional protection for natural resources. As the Alaska 
Supreme Court explained in Brooks v. Wright, “application of 
private trust principles may be counterproductive to the goals of 
the trust relationship in the context of natural resources.”329 The 
same is true here.
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, of course, 
concluded that application of the 1947 Act as a principle of private 
trust law furthers the purposes of section 27. “In essence, today’s
generation represents life tenants or life beneficiaries of the trust 
and tomorrow’s generation represents the remainder interest.”330
By allocating two-thirds of the payments from bonuses and rentals 
to the constitutional trust as principal and one-third of the 
payments to income for use as the Commonwealth sees fit, the Act 
provides “an equitable balance between the needs of present and 
future generations of Pennsylvanians.”331 “This disposition fulfills 
Section 27’s purpose and intent to ‘conserve and maintain’
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources for the benefit of all the 
329. Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1032 (Alaska 1999).
330. PEDF III, 214 A.3d 748, 761 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019).
331. Id. at 774.
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people while also allowing today’s generation of Pennsylvanians to 
benefit in other ways from the revenue produced.”332
While the commonwealth court’s analogy of present and future 
generations to trust beneficiaries and remaindermen has some 
appeal, closer inspection renders it less appealing.333 The purpose 
of the private trusts covered by section 9 of the Principal and 
Income Act of 1947 is to create financial benefits for the 
beneficiaries, whether they are income beneficiaries or remainder 
beneficiaries. The one case applying section 9 cited by the com-
monwealth court, In re McLean’s Estate, involved precisely that kind 
of trust.334 By contrast, while section 27 resources are being leased 
to produce income, income generation is not a specified purpose 
of the trust. Rather, the specified purpose of the trust is to 
“conserve and maintain” public natural resources.
The beneficiaries of private trusts governed by the 1947 Act, 
moreover, are discrete people who are identified by name or class 
in the trust instrument. The identity of tenants and remaindermen 
in private trusts is fixed more or less permanently in the trust 
instrument. By contrast, as people are born, and as people die, no 
permanent distinction exists between present and future 
generations in section 27. The large, continually shifting current 
population of Pennsylvanians is simply not analogous to the 
limited and identifiable set of beneficiaries of a financial trust.
In addition, as already suggested, the private trusts involved in 
the Principal and Income Act of 1947 have been bounded in 
time—usually by the lives of the beneficiaries. When such a trust 
terminates, it is perfectly fine for the remainder beneficiaries to 
spend the money that was in the trust however they see fit. The 
section 27 trust, by contrast, is effectively perpetual. It contains no 
termination date or ground for termination. There is thus no 
comparable basis for saying that trust fund moneys are free of the 
trust obligation. The section 27 trust is also constitutional law, 
which enhances its durability.
332. Id. (emphasis added).
333. This analysis assumes that section 9 embodies a principle of trust law, and is not 
simply a statutory provision. If section 9 is the latter, it is unresponsive to the state supreme 
court’s remand directions that the commonwealth court consider “underlying principles of 
Pennsylvania trust law in effect at the time of its enactment.” PEDF II, 161 A.3d 911, 930 (Pa. 
2017) A principle is a “basic rule, law, or doctrine,” and especially “one of the fundamental 
tenets of a system.” Principle, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Principle, THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3rd ed. 1992) (defining 
principle as a “basic truth, law, or assumption”). A principle is thus quite different from a 
statute. Section 9 could arguably embody a principle—that certain proceeds from natural 
resources extraction should be allocated two-thirds to principal and one-third to income—
but the commonwealth court did not analyze it in that way.
334. See supra notes 267–68 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the proper allocation of income and principal between 
different specified individuals and classes of individuals in a private 
trust has important financial consequences for each. By contrast, in 
the public trust context, while all of those affected by section 27 
may benefit from the public trust, none of them are directed by 
section 27 to receive any financial benefit or, for that matter, any 
benefit at all. Rather, the benefits involve quality of life, recreation, 
a healthy and unpolluted environment, and the like—benefits 
whose value is difficult to measure in economic terms and which 
may not be personally experienced by each current individual 
member of the present generation, let alone future generations.
Thus, the present generation is not analogous to the income 
beneficiaries from a private trust and entitled to one-third of 
receipts from bonus and rental payments free and clear of the 
constitutional public trust obligation.
There is also a strong basis for concluding that using the 
Principal and Income Act of 1947 as a principle of private trust law 
would undermine or frustrate the section 27 public trust. The 
commonwealth court’s conclusion contradicts PEDF II because the 
1947 Act on its face applies not just to bonus and rental payments 
from natural resources extraction; it also applies to royalties.
Section 9 of that Act—the basis for the commonwealth court’s
decision—provides that “one-third of the net proceeds, if received as 
rent or payment on a lease, or as royalties, shall be deemed income, and 
the remaining two-thirds thereof shall be deemed principal to be 
invested to produce income.”335 Yet in PEDF II the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court decided that all royalty money from oil and gas 
leases is to be used to “conserve and maintain” public natural 
resources. It did so largely on the strength of the “conserve and 
maintain” requirement in section 27. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court also employed a mix of charitable and private law—not a 
private law interpretation of the Principal and Income Act of 
1947—to decide the proper allocation of royalty payments.336 If 
that Act is not the proper trust law for determining allocation of 
royalties, then it is hard to see a plausible basis for using it to 
determine the allocation of bonus and rental payments. Of course, 
a trust instrument could be drafted to treat royalties differently 
than bonus and rental income, in which case it would be proper to 
apply the trust principle directing that proceeds be distributed 
according to the trust instrument. But section 27 is not drafted that 
335. 1947 PA. LAWS 1283, as amended, formerly 21 PA. STAT. § 3470.9 (emphasis added).
336. PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 933–35; see also supra note 211 (summary of key private and 
charitable trust law decisions cited therein).
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way, and no other principle of trust law appears to direct such a 
distribution under these circumstances.
Is there any other proper basis for treating rental and bonus 
payments differently from royalty payments? The Commonwealth 
Court of Pennsylvania thought so. Rentals, the commonwealth 
court said, “secure the lessee’s right to enter the property for 
exploratory and development purposes and the rents accrue based 
on the mere passage of time, not the production of oil or gas.”337
Similarly, the commonwealth court reasoned, bonuses “are 
consideration for the execution of the lease, and not consideration 
for severance of the mineral.”338 The Commonwealth can keep this 
money even if no oil and gas are produced.339
But focusing on the narrow question of oil and gas production 
misses the bigger picture: These leases all involve public natural 
resources, and every one of them involves bonuses and rentals, as 
well as potential royalties. Bonus and rental money is paid on leas-
es that generate no royalties, and it is also paid on leases that gen-
erate royalties. These leases all permit the same activities. In these 
instruments, DCNR
does hereby grant, demise, lease, and let, exclusively unto 
Lessee for the purposes only of exploring, drilling, 
operating, producing, and removing of oil, gas and liquid 
hydrocarbons; and at locations subject to the approval of 
District Forester, acting for [DCNR], the laying of pipelines 
and the building of roads, tanks, towers, stations, and 
structures thereon to produce, save, take care of, and 
transport said products . . . .340
Every lease gives the lessee the right to exclude activities that 
would interfere with its rights under the lease, including activities 
by the public. Every lease to a particular company necessarily 
excludes other companies from the same public lands. And all of 
them involve some environmental impact, or the potential for 
some environmental impact, on public natural resources. These 
leases would not be entered into but for the possibility of obtaining 
oil, gas, or other hydrocarbons; the bonus and rental payments 
derive from that purpose.341 As the Commonwealth Court of Penn-
337. PEDF III, 214 A.3d 748, 773 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019).
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 771.
341. See PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 935–36 (directing the Commonwealth Court, on remand, to 
determine the “true purpose” of these payments, whether it be “rental of a leasehold 
interest in the land, payment for the natural gas extracted, or some other purpose”).
144 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:1
sylvania explained in PEDF III, the leasing process that results in 
bonus and rental payments is the same leasing process that results 
in oil and gas royalties;342 there is no separate leasing process for 
state lands that involves only bonus and rental payments. In leasing 
for oil and gas, DCNR does not and cannot know in advance which 
leases will produce only bonus and rental payments, and which will 
also produce royalties.343 Even if oil and gas are not extracted 
under a particular lease, the lease still has an impact on the use, 
condition, and availability of public forest resources. The bonus 
and rental money is consideration for the legal right to have those 
impacts.
The use of section 9 of the 1947 Act as a principle of private 
trust law impedes the purpose of section 27 in at least three addi-
tional ways, all identified above. It allows the use of public trust re-
sources to generate income for non-trust purposes; it reduces the 
likelihood that sufficient funds will be available to conserve and 
maintain those resources; and it prioritizes the present generation 
over future generations. The use of this principle to interpret the 
meaning of section 27 is not appropriate.
CONCLUSION
The many different public trusts for natural resources reflect 
fundamental public values about the public use and availability of 
those resources over many generations. Because public trusts for 
these resources operate as both a limit and a duty for the 
governmental trustees, because trust law permeates the 
background understanding of what these limits and duties mean,
and because the contours of the public trust are often not well 
defined, it is both necessary and appropriate to consider the use of 
traditional trust law for guidance. But the judicial use of these 
principles can further or hinder these public trusts, depending on 
which principles are chosen.
Some traditional trust law principles, such as prudence, loyalty, 
and impartiality toward beneficiaries, should strengthen and clarify 
the duties and limits of natural resource trustees in nearly any 
context. Other principles apply only to charitable trusts, private 
342. PEDF III, 214 A.3d at 773.
343. If there is a significant difference in the leases between bonuses and rentals, on one 
hand, and royalties on the other, it would seem to run afoul of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s injunction in PEDF II. See PEDF II, 161 A.3d at 936 (“Oil and gas leases may not be 
drafted in ways that remove assets from the corpus of the trust or otherwise deprive the trust 
beneficiaries (the people, including future generations) of the funds necessary to conserve 
and maintain the public natural resources.”).
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trusts, or other types of trusts. Courts have decided to apply these 
other trust law principles to specific natural resources trusts when 
these principles further the language and purpose of these trusts,
and courts have refused to apply these trust law principles when 
they would hinder or undermine public trusts.
When courts are forced to choose between charitable trust law 
and private trust law, courts should strongly consider (but not au-
tomatically favor) the law of charitable trusts—particularly 
perpetual charitable trusts. These trusts are in many ways 
analogous to natural resources trusts. Both are created for public 
purposes, have no termination date, have a large and unnamed 
class of beneficiaries, and require the trustee to protect and 
maintain the trust corpus in perpetuity. While some aspects of 
private trust law can be useful in defining public trustee duties and 
limits, the wealth or income maximization aspects of private trust 
law can easily undermine or distort public trusts for natural 
resources.
This Article’s four-part methodology for determining whether 
and how to use specific trust law principles to help interpret the 
meaning of public trusts for natural resources is intended to assist 
lawyers and judges in analyzing this issue in a way that honors the 
language and purposes of any particular public trust for natural re-
sources. Traditional trust law helped create public trusts for natu-
ral resources, and traditional trust law, properly applied, can make 
them stronger.

